

Supplementary Materials: Summary of Evidence

Mostly Positive Outcome

Table 2.1—Summary of Evidence	
Study	Cherney (2018) Islamist and far-right violent radicalization
Program and Country	Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM), Australia.
Objectives of the Program	Distance radicalized inmates from violent extremism and facilitate their reintegration into society through individualized intervention plans. PRISM consisted of tailored interventions delivered by a team of psychologists working in partnership with a religious support officer, services and programs officers, health professionals, and other agents if needed.
Sample Characteristics	<i>12 former or current PRISM clients:</i> 11 men, one woman; 11 radical Muslim, one white supremacist; age, nationality, and socioeconomic status not provided. <i>10 former or current PRISM staff:</i> They directly assisted offenders in meeting their goals; gender, age, and socioeconomic status not provided. Participants were recruited through the assistance of the Corrective Services New South Wales and the New South Wales ombudsman.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Semi-structured interviews with 12 PRISM clients:</i> Interviews were conducted face-to-face by the author and lasted between one and two hours. The study tried to determine if PRISM interventions changed the self-perceptions and behaviors of participants. The interviews covered a wide range of topics: motivations to participate in the program, concerns about participation, perceived benefits, and usefulness of each program component. <i>Interviews with 10 staff members:</i> Interviews about topics such as the engagement of PRISM clients, intervention goals, progress, and what changes or setbacks were observed in clients. Qualitative interview data was coded by the author based on thematic analysis using NVivo 12.
Positive Outcomes	11 of the 12 offenders reported at least one benefit from participating in the PRISM intervention. PRISM staff also reported that clients drew many implicit and explicit benefits and progressed through the intervention. According to those who delivered and received it, PRISM helps to improve psychological coping, promote self-reflection and offense insight, and develop prosocial support and activities while concentrating on religious mentoring.
Negative Outcomes	One participant did not report any benefits from participating in PRISM.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mostly positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Small sample based on availability and willingness to be interviewed; 2) Potential social desirability bias; 3) Due to information sensitivity, no test for interrater reliability was administered; 4) Qualitative nature of the data; 5) Several participants had already begun the process of disengagement before starting the program; 6) Interviewing clients who were still participating in the intervention risked distorting the intervention outcomes.
Limitations (Team)	1) Little information on the sample; 2) The level of participation in PRISM was not accounted for, even though it could have influenced outcomes; 3) Weak temporal validity (the findings could be superficial or temporary); 4) Relevant findings are based on subjective perceptions, with limited methodological details surrounding data collection and analysis; 5) Potential bias in the selection of participants.
Quality of Study (/10)	6

The Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) is a voluntary program for convicted terrorists and inmates showing extremist behaviors and/or associations with radicalized individuals. The objective of PRISM is to distance radicalized inmates from violent extremism and facilitate their reintegration into society. Unlike most traditional correctional programs, it is not structured in predetermined modules. Instead, it is a support service with individualized intervention plans that aims to fulfill radicalized offenders' needs, whether they are psychological, theological, social, or ideological. This qualitative study explored the perceived benefits of participating in PRISM interventions, according to 12 current or former clients. Of this small sample, 11 were men, and one was a woman. All participants but one were radical Muslims, the other being a white supremacist.

Of these individuals, five participants were imprisoned for terrorism-related offenses, and seven individuals, despite being in prison for unrelated offenses, were considered at-risk of radicalization on account of prison behavior or associations. The levels of participation in the intervention varied from two sessions to two years of engagement. Participants were interviewed face-to-face by the researcher. Only one offender did not report any benefit of participating in PRISM. However, he was newly accepted into the program and had not yet determined his intervention goals or finished his evaluation. All other participants reported benefits from PRISM. In order to verify if the perceived benefits of clients were consistent with program staff observations, 10 previous and current PRISM staff members were interviewed. The staff interviewees agreed with most changes reported by the offenders. According to the clients and program staff, the perceived benefits of PRISM intervention included: **a)** promoting self-reflection by establishing educational goals; **b)** improved psychological health; **c)** improved insights into one's offense; **d)** improved resilience and religious comprehension to counter the influence of other radicalized individuals; and **e)** improved prosocial supports and activities. While the study highlights positive outcomes related to facilitating disengagement, Cherney (2018) raised many limitations, namely the small convenience sample, potential social desirability biases among participants, the lack of a test for interrater reliability, the subjective nature of the data, and the fact that several participants had already begun the process of disengagement before starting the program, possibly inflating the positive outcomes reported. Not mentioned by authors were the lack of information about the sample and methodology, not considering the level of participation in PRISM, weak temporal validity, and probable biases in the selection of participants.

Table 2.2—Summary of Evidence

Study	Cherney & Belton (2019) Islamist and far-right violent radicalization
Program and Country	Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM), Australia.
Objectives of the Program	Distance radicalized inmates from violent extremism and facilitate their reintegration into society through individualized intervention plans.
Sample Characteristics	10 former and four current PRISM clients (23 to 49 years old) who had a conviction for terrorism or were identified as at risk of radicalization due to extremist views or associations. They were predominantly of North-African and Middle-Eastern cultural background (64.3%). In addition, some clients were from an Oceanian (21.4%), South-East Asian (7.1%), or unknown background. All participants were Muslim, except one catholic white supremacist. Half of the offenders had completed secondary school, 21% had completed technical and further education courses, 14.3% had solely completed primary school, and 14.3% had tertiary education. Of the 14 offenders, six (42.9%) had children, six were married (42.9%), five were single (35.7%), two were in a relationship (14.3%), and one was divorced (7.1%).
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Using content analysis, the qualitative information collected from the case notes of participants and RADAR need-and-risks assessment was coded, then analyzed as quantitative data. Inter-rater reliability was good (Krippendorf's alpha of .98). Engagement dates were collected, for a total of 147 dates across 14 offenders (minimum of three visits, maximum of 23, and an average of 10 engagement dates). Change was assessed by a present or absent variable. In addition, the number of intervention goals per offender were compiled, varying from 11 to 17 ($M = 13$). Finally, in order to compare participants, they were separated according to their offense type; those who committed terrorist acts ($n = 5$) and those who were convicted for another type of crime but were considered at risk of radicalization ($n = 9$).
Positive Outcomes	The "terrorist" group had a higher average engagement number ($M = 15.60$) than the "at-risk" group ($M = 7.67$), and the difference was statistically significant. On average, it took 2.50 visits for offenders in the "terrorist" group before change was evident, and 3.86 visits for the "at-risk" group. There was a consistency across the two groups regarding the proportion of visits that were required to show change (ratio of total change/total engagement dates). Finally, the higher the frequency of engagement in PRISM over time was, the more likely clients were to display signs of disengagement in their behaviors and attitudes. This was true for both groups. Therefore, the intensity of the intervention, as determined by the number of engagements per visit, appeared to affect the progress towards disengagement.
Negative Outcomes	For both groups, the number of intervention goals did not significantly correlate with change.

Overall Outcome of the Program	Mostly positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Case notes and assessment tools could be biased by the individuals who rated them. Also, due to inconsistent and insufficient recording of relapse (e.g., re-emergence of extremist beliefs or behaviors) in case notes, no distinction was made between absence of change and relapse; 2) Small sample size; 3) Absence of experimental design and control group makes it impossible to determine causality and if results are due to PRISM; 4) No real measure of intervention outcomes was made.
Limitations (Team)	PRISM is a voluntary program, which means that clients who decided to participate in it might have specific characteristics (e.g., motivation) distinguishing them from other inmates.
Quality of Study (/10)	10

Cherney and Belton (2019) presented the findings from the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM), a voluntary, custody-based intervention program. The 14 participants were former and current PRISM clients (23 to 49 years old), predominantly of North-African and Middle-Eastern cultural background, and they were all Muslim, except for one catholic white supremacist. Five individuals were imprisoned for terrorism-related offenses, and nine were detained for another type of crime but identified as at-risk of radicalization due to extremist views or associations. Case notes of the 14 offenders were used as data sources, and for 11 of them, their RADARs (i.e., an Australian CVE intervention tool to assess risks and needs and guide intervention) were also used. Data encompassed demographic information, offense type and criminal history, childhood and adult experiences, religion, radicalization source, and intervention-related variables. In order to examine PRISM progress data, content analysis was conducted to identify instances of change. The average recorded episodes of disengagement (i.e., instances of change) for all participants was 3.36. To compare differences between PRISM participants who were convicted of a terrorist-related offense ($n = 5$) to those who were referred because of their risk of radicalization ($n = 9$), participants were separated into two groups. An independent t-test showed a statistically significant difference in the average number of visits between the terrorist and at-risk groups. The average time it took for participants to show change was 2.50 visits in the terrorist group and 3.86 visits for the at-risk group. The proportion of visits (i.e., total change/total engagement dates) that demonstrated change for the terrorist group was .254 and .250 for the at-risk group, indicating consistency across groups. Next, a Pearson correlation was calculated to assess the relationship between time engaged and client change—a significant positive correlation was found. In other words, the more often a participant engaged with PRISM over time, the more likely they were to exhibit behaviors and attitudes that demonstrate disengagement. A Pearson correlation was used to assess the relationship between the number of intervention goals and client progress, but no significant correlation was found (note that the small sample size makes statistical significance unlikely here). Limitations mentioned by the authors include the potential bias of qualitative thematic analysis, the small sample size, the absence of a control group, and limited outcome measures. In addition to those, it is possible that participants in PRISM—a voluntary program—might have different characteristics (e.g., motivation) than those not in the program, which affects generalizability.

Table 2.3—Summary of Evidence

Study	Madriaza et al. (2018) General radicalization
Program and Country	CODE (<i>Croyances</i> [Beliefs], Observations, Decryption, Expression), France.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Main objective:</i> Encourage offenders to desist from the process of radicalization leading to violence. <i>Intermediate objectives:</i> 1) Promote social integration by encouraging dual membership; 2) Develop critical thinking skills; 3) Promote personal accountability for one's action.
Sample Characteristics	The CODE intervention was implemented on users ($n = 6$) from the Nice reinsertion and probation penitentiary services. All participants were convicted for terrorist acts or had begun a process of radicalization leading to violence. The sample comprised six men (mean age = 29 years old). Three participants were born in France, one in Algeria, and two did not provide details of their birthplace. Four individuals were single, one was in a relationship, and one was married. In terms of educational background, one never finished college, one did, two men dropped out of high school, one graduated high school, and one did not answer the question. Two men were employed, and four were unemployed. Because one participant

	was incarcerated during the implementation of the program, he was removed from subsequent analyses.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	A pre- and post-test design was used to evaluate the outcomes of the program. <i>The same online questionnaire was administered before and after the intervention, with items measuring seven domains of interest</i> 1) sympathy towards radicalization (SyfoR); 2) integrative complexity (Moral Dilemmas Test); 3) self-uncertainty (Scale of Self-Uncertainty); 4) self-esteem (Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale); 5) empathy (Basic Empathy Scale); 6) social isolation (Social and Emotional Loneliness Scale for Adults); and 7) anxiety and depression (Symptom Scale Hopkins-25). The post-test questionnaire added 10 items to measure user satisfaction.
Positive Outcomes	1) Self-instability decreased between the pre- and post-test, but the effect was not statistically significant; 2) The overall satisfaction of CODE users was very high; participants mentioned they were very satisfied with the activities followed, topics discussed, and stakeholder performance, and thus recommended participation in the program; 3) All users agreed that activities were helpful in solving the problems responsible for their incarceration.
Negative Outcomes	Due to time restrictions and insufficient participants, another tertiary prevention program (<i>Accordéon</i>) could not be implemented.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mostly positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Small sample size (only five individuals completed the program); 2) Participants were selected according to very strict criteria, which limits generalizability; 3) Many of the assessed indicators require considerable time to change, but follow-up was limited; 4) There were missing data in the CODE pre- and post-tests (only one of the seven indicators could be assessed).
Limitations (Team)	1) Inconsistencies in the writing (change in the number of participants from one page to another); 2) Psychometric instruments were translated by the researchers, which limits content validity (though translations were reviewed by stakeholders); 3) Potential bias, as authors were responsible for the implementation and evaluation of the program.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

Madriaza et al. (2018) implemented an 18-month research-action project in three sites in France. This project aimed to develop an intervention model for offenders who are radicalized or at risk of becoming radicalized and who are released into the community. These individuals were under the jurisdiction of the reinsertion and probation penitentiary services. The report presents in detail the implementation of the project, as well as an assessment of its outcomes. In order to assess the impacts of the program, a pre- and post-test design was used. The same online questionnaire was administered before and after the intervention in order to measure seven dimensions of interest: sympathy towards radicalization, integrative complexity, self-uncertainty, self-esteem, empathy, social isolation, and mental health (anxiety and depression). The 99 items measuring these dimensions were taken from empirically validated instruments (i.e., translated by authors and reviewed by stakeholders when necessary). In the post-test questionnaire, 10 items were added to assess user satisfaction. The CODE (*Croyances* [Beliefs], Observations, Decryption, Expression) program comprised six participants, but one was incarcerated during the program and removed from data analysis. Results showed that participants were very satisfied with and would recommend participating in the program. However, because many questions were not answered by participants, especially during the pre-test, the only dimension with enough data to assess outcomes was self-uncertainty. This variable showed a decrease between the pre- and post-test, but the effect was not statistically significant—an anticipated result with such a small sample. Integrative complexity could not be evaluated because participants did not provide texts of sufficient quality to be used. Limitations acknowledged by authors include the small sample size, limited generalizability, and limited follow-up time to detect lasting changes. Other limitations include using psychometric tests with a “homemade” translation in the absence of an official version (of note, efforts were made to ensure the validity of translations, which were reviewed by stakeholders), slight inconsistencies in the writing of the report (i.e., change in the number of participants from one page to another), and a potential conflict of interest (authors were responsible for the implementation and evaluation of the program).

Table 2.4—Summary of Evidence

Study	Meringolo et al. (2019) General radicalization
Program and Country	PROVA, Italy.
Objectives of the Program	Counteract violent radicalization among young offenders through civic education in support of democracy and transformation of collective spaces toward collective opportunities.
Sample Characteristics	<i>Part 1.</i> <i>n</i> = 18 (social and educational professionals/stakeholders from the Director of the Centre of Juvenile Justice and the Imam of the Islamic Community). <i>Part 2.</i> <i>n</i> = 19 (15 male minors/young adults in detention [mean age = 18], and two male and two female students from schools of psychology and social work [mean age = 24]).
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Part 1.</i> Semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Thematic analyses to measure program satisfaction and evaluate strategies at the micro and macro levels. <i>Part 2.</i> Self-evaluation questionnaires on a four-point Likert scale to measure participants' interest and satisfaction with the program (quantitative). Open ended questions about their acquired learning, contributions, and observations (qualitative). Student diaries were also scanned for critical reflections about the peer-to-peer experience (qualitative). Descriptive statistics for quantitative data, thematic analyses for qualitative data.
Positive Outcomes	<i>Part 1.</i> 1) Participants positively evaluated the program in terms of young offenders' education and social inclusion outcomes; 2) Working with small groups and doing conflict mediation were identified to have possible positive impact at the micro level; 3) At the macro level, the implementation of community-based educational programs showed promising results in promoting civic engagement and spreading democratic values. <i>Part 2.</i> 1) Minors in detention positively assessed the eight meetings of the workshop in terms of both interest and satisfaction (quantitative). Qualitative analysis also revealed a positive evaluation of the workshop by participants; 2) Attending the workshop helped them learn how to socialize and to work in a group; 3) By reimagining spaces, young offenders were able to form a new definition of the self and discovered their ability to interact positively with peers and professionals; 4) Students participating in the workshop showed reduced prejudice about minors in detention, which allowed them to have a relationship with them; 5) They learned how to cope with negative emotions and concerns about young offenders' future; 6) Students improved their knowledge and competencies, increased self-awareness about their future professional roles, and acquired new socio-relational skills to interact with marginalized youth.
Negative Outcomes	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mostly positive.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	1) Small sample size; 2) Lack of formal follow-up measures that evaluate the long-term influence of the program; 3) Potential conflicts of interest (stakeholders were involved in the implementation and evaluation of the program).
Quality of Study (/10)	5 (Note that this paper is a brief report, which may affect its quality score.)

Meringolo et al. (2019) evaluated the impact of the PROVA program that was designed to counteract violent radicalization among young offenders in Italy through civic education in support of democracy and transformation of collective spaces toward collective opportunities. The research was divided into two parts. Part 1 aimed to identify the best practices to prevent the violent radicalization of delinquent (and thus vulnerable) youth. To do so, the authors conducted a qualitative study to explore perceptions of 16 social educational professionals and two stakeholders from the Director of the Centre of Juvenile Justice and the Imam of the Islamic Community who work directly or indirectly in the juvenile justice system. Two semi-structured interviews and three focus groups were conducted and analyzed using thematic analyses. Results showed that participants evaluated the program positively in terms of young offenders' education and social inclusion outcomes. Existing best practices, such as alternative detention measures and educational programs implemented inside prisons, were identified as effective. Working with small groups and doing conflict mediation at the micro level showed promising positive impacts. At the macro level, the implementation of community-based educational programs was shown to promote civic engagement and spread democratic values. In part 2, the research involved peer-to-peer interaction between four university students in training (mean age = 24, two men and two women) and 15 minors/young adults in detention (mean age = 18, all men). A

self-evaluation questionnaire on a four-point Likert scale, open-ended questions and diaries kept by the students were analyzed through thematic analysis to evaluate a workshop which was centered on the reimagination of collective spaces inside the juvenile prison to make the space more open to coexistence and less exposed to violent intergroup relations. The quantitative results showed that, in general, minors in detention positively assessed the eight meetings of the workshop in terms of interest and satisfaction. Qualitative analysis also revealed a positive evaluation of the workshop by participants. Minors reported that attending the workshop helped them learn how to socialize and to work in a group. Young offenders were able to form a new definition of the self and discovered their ability to interact positively with peers and professionals. As for the students, participation in the workshop reduced their prejudice about minors in detention and allowed them to have a relationship with them. Students also learned how to cope with negative emotions and concerns about young offenders' futures. Furthermore, students improved their knowledge and competencies, increased self-awareness about their future professional roles, and acquired new socio-relational skills to interact with marginalized youth. While the results of this study are promising, they are subject to limitations not mentioned by authors: small sample size, lack of follow-up in the weeks after the workshop, and issues related to conflicts of interest (stakeholders of PROVA were involved in its assessment).

Table 2.5—Summary of Evidence

Study	Barkindo & Bryans (2016) Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Nigeria's Countering Violent Extremism Program, Nigeria.
Objectives of the Program	Change the beliefs, views, values, and attitudes of the violent extremist prisoners, alongside their behavior (as indicated by disengagement from violence).
Sample Characteristics	<i>45 adult male violent extremist prisoners (one was sentenced, and the remainder were pre-trial detainees)</i> . 48% were aged between 31 and 40 years old; 81% were Muslim; 60% were married; and 35% were educated to at least the secondary school level (some were highly educated with university degrees and came from privileged backgrounds). All had engaged in various levels of radicalized conduct (although many denied it), ranging from low-level operatives in violent extremist groups to leadership positions with influential and powerful decision-making opportunities.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Information was gathered through interviews, observations of behavior, prison and court records, and by government services and agencies. <i>A risk assessment tool was developed that included 47 indicators grouped under a number of dimensions, including: 1) motivation for committing a violent extremist act; 2) level of commitment to violent extremist acts; 3) personality (attitudes, beliefs), feelings, and behavior; 4) context and intent; 5) background, history, and capability; and 6) any risk education factors.</i> <i>The impact of the interventions was measured through indicators such as: 1) changes in the prisoners' behavior; 2) level of engagement with the interventions; 3) number of institutional incidents; and 4) number of interventions completed.</i>
Positive Outcomes	1) In general, decreased risk of radicalization across a number of indicators for many prisoners; 2) Violent extremist prisoners, who previously refused to engage with staff, started to enter positive dialogue and, in most cases, responded constructively; 3) The interventions provided opportunities to develop alternative ways to meet prisoners' needs, and some participants started to question their involvement with violent extremist groups; 4) Some participants showed dissatisfaction and disillusionment with their involvement in extremist groups; 5) Many gained a more detailed knowledge of religious texts and alternative interpretations; 6) Participants also gained valuable vocational, reading, and writing skills; 7) For prison staff, particularly those directly engaged with the program, it has opened a new channel of handling and engaging constructively with prisoners; 8) There were also indicators of tensions easing between violent extremist prisoners and the general prison population.
Negative Outcomes	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mostly positive.

Limitations (Authors)	1) Data were collected at a very early stage of the program; 2) Authors were not able to directly access prisoners' files because of the sensitivity of the information contained; 3) Due to the intervention's short operation period, follow-up time was limited and, therefore, participation had no impact on sentencing or prison terms.
Limitations (Team)	Potential conflict of interest, as both authors were part of a technical assistance team that was involved throughout the first phase of the program.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

Barkindo and Bryans (2016) evaluated a pilot deradicalization project operated at a Nigerian prison. The program's goal was to change the beliefs, views, values, and attitudes of violent extremist prisoners, thereby persuading them to abandon engagement in violent extremist acts and groups. Forty-five adult male prisoners were recruited: 48% were aged between 31 and 40 years old; 81% were Muslim; 60% were married; and 35% were educated to at least the secondary school level. All had engaged in radicalized conduct, ranging from low-level operatives to leadership positions with influential decision-making prospects. Several prisoners denied any degree of commitment to violent extremism, although this needed to be seen in the context of their pre-trial status. Finally, some of the prisoners were highly educated (i.e., had a university degree) and came from privileged backgrounds. The program offered motivational interviewing, vocational training and work experience, educational and cultural activities, art therapy, sports and games, and religious, psychological, and counseling interventions. Program designers developed their own risk assessment tool with 47 indicators grouped under multiple dimensions such as motivation for committing a violent extremist act; level of commitment to violent extremist acts; personality (attitudes, beliefs), feelings, behavior; background, history, capability; and risk reduction factors. Information was gathered through interviews, observations, prison and court records, and by government services and agencies. Changes in the prisoners' behavior, level of engagement with the interventions, number of institutional incidents and number of interventions completed were observed, in addition to the risk assessment tool, in order to measure the impact of the intervention. Although the research took place at an early stage of the intervention, the results were promising. Participants, who previously refused to participate with prison staff, were able to engage in positive dialogue and, in most cases, responded constructively. Some started to question their involvement with violent extremist groups and found alternative ways to meet their needs. Through exposure to detailed knowledge of religious texts, participants came to identify inconsistencies and inaccuracies in their own beliefs. Many also gained valuable vocational, reading, and writing skills. For prison staff, particularly those directly engaged with the program, it opened a new channel of handling and engaging constructively with prisoners. Finally, there were indicators of tensions easing between violent extremist prisoners and the general prison population. The study, however, suffers from several limitations. First, as mentioned by the authors, data collection took place at an early stage of the program. Second, prisoners' files could not be accessed because of the sensitivity of the data, which limited in-depth analysis. Third, because of the intervention's short operation period, there was limited follow-up, and, therefore, participation had no impact on sentencing or prison terms. Finally, the results should be approached cautiously due to possible conflict of interest, as both authors were part of a technical assistance team that was involved throughout the first phase of the program.

Table 2.6—Summary of Evidence

Study	Azam & Fatima (2017) Tertiary prevention Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Mishal Deradicalization and Emancipation Program (DREP), Pakistan.
Objectives of the Program	Provide an environment favorable to the deradicalization of arrested Taliban fighters who have not engaged in killings (no "blood on hand"). The program aims to remove the psychological burden placed by ideological exploitation and/or coercion in order to make the participants productive members of society.
Sample Characteristics	<i>n</i> = 20: 12 were current or former beneficiaries of the program and eight were administrators of the program or course facilitators. No further information was given on the sample except that it was the Mishal center that determined which beneficiaries could be interviewed, depending on their risk level and emotional stability. However, information on the demographic and psychological profiles of the 47 individuals enrolled in the deradicalization program was given. The beneficiaries seemed to share the following characteristics: 1) most were between 21 and 30 years old; 2) most were illiterate

	or had less than 10 years of education; 3) only half were married; and 4) most were incarcerated for 4+ years.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Quantitative study:</i> The researchers gathered quantitative data in relation to the demographic profiles of 47 beneficiaries (i.e., age, past occupations, time spent in prison, marital status, education, and socioeconomic profile).</p> <p><i>Qualitative study:</i> 20 semi-structured, open-ended, and exploratory interviews with 12 current and former beneficiaries of the program and eight administrators/course facilitators. The interviews were conducted at the Mishal center. Program documentation was also examined by the authors. The interviews had two main objectives: 1) understanding the push and pull factors responsible for the radicalization of the militants (low socioeconomic status, large and broken family structure with little supervision of activities, history of physical abuse as a child, strict behavior of parents/teachers, lack of education or religious knowledge, low IQ, emotional instability, anxiety disorder and depression, revenge-seeking behavior, authority-seeking behavior); and 2) assessing the effectiveness of the deradicalization program.</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p>1) 99% success rate in reintegrating militants to their community; 2) Low recidivism rate (less than 1%); 3) A total of 1478 beneficiaries have been released between 2010 and 2015; 4) The religious education module has been helpful to a participant in conveying the right meaning of the Quran; 5) Another respondent said he learned it is good to consult others whenever he has a problem before taking a decision, as well as about respecting elders and how to behave with the young; 6) An interviewee said he learned a lot about religion and respect towards parents; 7) According to administrators, meetings with family members helped to improve beneficiaries' support system and offered an alternative to ties with militants; 8) The vocational module seemed effective.</p>
Negative Outcomes	<p>1) The military relies on its own clerics, and this reduced the impact of the religious education module; 2) Most beneficiaries were illiterate, and the religious education module did not fully fit their situation; 3) Only a few participants were able to share what they have learnt from the religious education module; 4) Mishal DREP is, in fact, a disengagement program, not a deradicalization program, as it focuses on the reintegration of low-level militants with "no blood on hands"; 5) The fact that the military supervises the deradicalization activities, instead of the NGO sector, limits the effectiveness of the program; 6) Insufficient personnel; 7) Lack of financial resources.</p>
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mostly positive.
Limitations (Authors)	<p>1) Only interviewees recommended by the program (i.e., former beneficiaries and militants who were considered emotionally stable and low-risk) were included in the research; 2) Short timeframe for field research; 3) Limited sample size; 4) Participants come from similar backgrounds in terms of religion, ethnicity, organizational affiliation, and geography; 5) Risk of bias due to the qualitative design and subjectivity of the authors; 6) Beneficiaries had an interest in being seen as rehabilitated and were aware that showing support for a militant group would have negative effects on their release; 7) Confirmation bias on both ends—the interviewees and the researchers.</p>
Limitations (Team)	<p>1) It is unclear whether the authors did an impact or process evaluation and they did not specify how qualitative data were analyzed (it seems they may have only selected a few quotes to support their conclusions); 2) No information on the questions that were asked during the interview; 3) No information on the data analysis procedure; 4) No information on the sample; 5) No information on the quantitative analysis performed; 6) No in-depth discussion on the "99% success rate of the program" and the factors that might have influenced it.</p>
Quality of Study (/10)	5

Azam and Fatima (2017) assessed the effectiveness of the Mishal Deradicalization and Emancipation Program (DREP) given in Pakistan. The Mishal DREP aimed to deradicalize and rehabilitate arrested Taliban fighters who have not engaged in killings. The three-month program consisted of psychological evaluations with a clinical psychologist, interviews of the militant's family members to uncover their life stories and assess the reasons they joined the militant group, a religious education module, monthly meetings with family members, psychosocial help to family members, and vocational training courses. The authors first collected quantitative information on the beneficiaries of the program in order to establish their sociodemographic profile. Then, 20

formal, semi-structured, open-ended, and exploratory interviews were conducted at the Mishal center with 12 current and former beneficiaries of the program and eight administrators/course facilitators. No further information was given on the sample other than the fact that it was the Mishal center that determined which beneficiaries could be interviewed, depending on their risk level and emotional stability. The interviews aimed to determine the push and pull factors leading to radicalization among beneficiaries of the center, as well as to assess the Mishal DREP through an in-depth case study. Results showed mostly positive outcomes, as the program seemed to maintain a 99% success rate in reintegrating its beneficiaries into their communities, with a recidivism rate of only 1%. According to program documents, a total of 1478 beneficiaries were released between 2010 and 2015. Participants stated that the religious education module helped them learn more about the Quran and about respecting parents and elders. Even though some participants were satisfied with the module, most of the negative outcomes of Mishal seemed to be related to it. The module—which took the form of lectures—failed to adapt to the reality of its beneficiaries, who were mostly illiterate. Moreover, the military leading the program, relied on its own clerics, which reduced the impact of the module (studies have established the need for credible religious figures in deradicalization programs). Lastly, according to the authors, the Mishal DREP was not a deradicalization but rather a disengagement program. A number of limitations were identified by the authors. These include limited sample size, limited access to the beneficiaries, risk of bias due to the qualitative design, the fact that participants had an interest in being seen as rehabilitated, and the short timeframe for the study. The study had other limitations not mentioned by the authors. There was a lack of information regarding several important components such as the sample, content of the interviews, and methodology employed to analyze quantitative and qualitative data. In addition, the authors did not make an in-depth discussion of the “99% success rate” claimed by the program, as such rate is rarely seen in the deradicalization field and could have important implications—provided it is not a byproduct of the low-risk sample.

Table 2.7—Summary of Evidence

Study	Peracha et al. (2016) Violent Islamist Radicalization
Program and Country	Sabaoon Program, Pakistan.
Objectives of the Program	<p>Sabaoon aims to deradicalize adolescent males who used to be involved with violent extremist groups and fulfill the needs these individuals had before joining these groups.</p> <p><i>Five main objectives:</i> 1) Provide a supportive and protective environment for the rehabilitation of adolescent males affected by militant ideology; 2) Provide psychosocial support to these adolescents and improve their ability to differentiate and integrate information related to values, morals, and ethical dilemmas (i.e., integrative complexity); 3) Deliver mainstream educational and vocational skills training in order to ensure that the vulnerable youth are goal-directed; 4) Provide corrective religious education; 5) Ensure a positive protective environment for participants, their families, and communities in order to optimize the participants’ reintegration chances.</p>
Sample Characteristics	<p>Adolescent and pre-adolescent males apprehended in SWAT and surrounding areas, due to their involvement in violent extremist activities. No further information was provided (<i>N</i> unclear, lack of sociodemographic information).</p> <p><i>Following the evaluation of 200 participants, the authors found that individuals enrolled in the Sabaoon program shared the following characteristics:</i> 1) low socioeconomic status/high poverty; 2) lack of logical reasoning/critical thinking; 3) large family size; 4) absence of a biological father (most were working abroad, in the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia); 5) middle child (of large families); 6) school dropouts; 7) lack of supervision on activities; 8) experienced head injury/possibility of soft neuropathology; 9) truancy/ran away from home (because of morbid trends and/or dropped out of school); 10) impulsivity, aggressive behaviors, anxiety, and insecurity; and 11) limited/selective understanding of religious doctrine and religion.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>This study employed a mixed methodology:</i> quantitative methods for the psychological evaluation of participants and qualitative methods for the collection of narratives and for case studies. The study is divided into two parts.</p> <p><i>Part I: The program.</i> Following their admission to the program, participants went through an initial clinician-led evaluation phase comprising four types of measures: 1) initial narratives; 2) psychometric assessments (Raven’s Progressive Matrices, subsets from Wechsler’s Intelligence Scales for Children and Adults, Wechsler Nonverbal Assessment,</p>

	<p>Trauma Assessment Scales, projective techniques such as House-Tree-Person and Bender Gestalt Test—only for 10 individuals); 3) family narratives (interviews with family members); and 4) community visit and risk evaluation. After the program, there was a post-reintegration phase where program graduates continued to receive psychosocial services and were evaluated in order to monitor their progression and, if necessary, readmit them into the program.</p> <p><i>Part 2: Case studies.</i> There were also four case studies measuring and evaluating the integrative complexity and cognitive ability of four Sabaoon participants.</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p><i>Positive outcomes of the program:</i> 1) The monitoring cell was effective in highlighting seven participants for re-induction into Sabaoon due to raised concerns regarding their re-radicalization and possibility of re-engagement; 2) 175 individuals were reintegrated into their communities; 3) There has been no recidivism in the reintegrated population.</p> <p><i>Positive outcomes related to case studies:</i> 1) Participants improved their ability to learn and accommodate new information; 2) They also improved their academic achievement, which resulted in positive outcomes such as improved self-concept, social empathy, and ability to see another's perspective; 3) One of the participants shared his own experience, guided other youths to focus on goal-directed activities, accommodated healthy coping strategies, and frequently sought his case manager for advice and feedback.</p>
Negative Outcomes	<p>1) Seven reintegrated individuals were starting to re-radicalize and had to be readmitted into the program (one of them was in the case study group); 2) The integrative complexity of participants remained between low and slightly above average only; 3) The intervention was not able to address non-individual risk factors such as the presence of peers who are still part of militant groups and social networks that could re-ignite a violent radicalization process.</p>
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mostly positive.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	<p>1) The number of individuals who followed the program remains unclear—having such information would give a better idea of the effectiveness of the program (e.g., they had 175 successful cases among how many cases?); 2) There is no information on cases where the reintegration was not successful; 3) The authors mention that participants were selected according to their age group, but fail to specify what the age range was; 4) It is unclear whether the authors re-assessed the participants at the end of the program in order to obtain pre-/post-data. Doing so would have been a better way of measuring the success of the program than the absence of recidivism; 5) There is no information on what the qualitative data was used for; 6) Methods are scarcely described; 7) No sociodemographic information about the sample is provided.</p>
Quality of Study (/10)	4

Peracha et al. (2016) reported the results of the Sabaoon program in Pakistan. Sabaoon is a disengagement and deradicalization program based on educational methods targeting adolescent and pre-adolescent males with history of involvement in violent extremist groups and participation in violent activities. The program aims to provide the participants with a protective and supportive environment for their rehabilitation, psychosocial support and mainstream education, corrective religious education, as well as to ensure a positive protective environment for their families. The program consists of an assessment phase, during which participants are being evaluated by a team of clinicians, an intervention phase, when they receive mainstream education, vocational training, corrective religious instruction, psychosocial support, and when they practice sports, and, lastly, a reintegration phase, during which they are followed-up by the Monitoring Center. Results show mostly positive outcomes of the program. In total, 175 individuals were successfully reintegrated into their communities—with no recidivism cases—and the Monitoring Center was successful in highlighting seven individuals for re-induction into the program, as they were showing signs of re-engagement in extremism. The four case studies made by the authors showed positive outcomes. Indeed, most participants strengthened their ability to learn and accommodate new information and improved their academic achievement, which resulted in positive outcomes such as improved self-concept, social empathy, and ability to see another's perspective. Moreover, one of the participants shared his own experience, guided other youths to focus on goal-directed activities, accommodated healthy coping strategies, and frequently sought his case manager for advice and feedback. However, the program had some negative outcomes. In fact, seven reintegrated individuals were

starting to re-radicalize and had to be re-inducted into the program (one of them was in the case study group). Also, the integrative complexity of participants remained between low and slightly above average only. Finally, the intervention was not able to address non-individual risk factors such as the presence of peers who are still part of militant groups and social networks that could re-ignite a violent radicalization process. This study has many—mostly methodological—limitations not mentioned by the authors. To name a few, there is very little information on the sample, including the total number of participants and those who have been successfully reintegrated. Also, the authors did not mention whether participants were re-assessed at the end of the program in order to obtain pre-/post-data. Doing so would have been a more relevant way of measuring the success of the interventions than the absence of recidivism. Lastly, there was no information on what the qualitative data was used for—and on methods in general.

Table 2.8—Summary of Evidence

Study	Kruglanski et al. (2014) Violent nationalist radicalization
Program and Country	The Sri Lankan Rehabilitation Program, Sri Lanka.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Main objective.</i> Disengage and deradicalize individuals who were members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eedu (LTTE) and prepare them for reintegration into society. <i>Specific objectives.</i> 1) Restore the detainees' sense of significance; 2) Shift detainees' focus onto their individual selves rather than their group membership within the LTTE, through spiritual programs like yoga and art activities that involve individual expression; 3) Prepare the beneficiaries for reintegration into society upon their release by providing vocational education courses.
Sample Characteristics	<i>Rehabilitation group.</i> detainees from six rehabilitation centers in Sri Lanka located in the northeastern parts of Sri Lanka (Tamil-populated). These centers included Pompemadu Peace Village Zone, Dharmapuram, Maradamadu, Pompemadu, TEC Technical College, and Tamil Primary College. The sample ($n = 1,906$; mean age = 27.5) comprised 1,737 males and 169 women. In the rehabilitation group, 49% had at least the equivalent of a high-school degree compared to 28.6% in the control sample. <i>Control group.</i> detainees from the Omahai center in Northern Sri Lanka, who, for logistic reasons, were not offered the rehabilitation programs (except for yoga and meditation). The control group ($n = 152$; mean age = 30.2) had a higher risk classification than the rehabilitation group (i.e., they were more involved in crimes and the LTTE recruitment). Detainees' gender was not specified.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<i>Pre- and post-tests measured differences in the following:</i> 1) organizational embeddedness (i.e., degree of personal involvement with the LTTE); 2) perceived friendliness of the centers' personnel; 3) degree of support for armed struggle against the Sinhalese; and 4) personality and demographic questionnaires (whose results were not discussed in the chapter). The first measures were taken in December 2009 and the second in September 2010.
Positive Outcomes	1) Participants' support for the armed struggle against the Sinhalese declined from December 2009 to September 2010 (statistically significant); 2) Participants who had a higher embeddedness score also showed a greater attitude change; 3) There was hardly any change in the control group; 4) The positive change in attitudes toward the center's personnel moderated the positive change toward the Sinhalese; those whose attitude toward the personnel improved reduced their support for the violent struggle against the Sinhalese to a greater extent (but not in the control group).
Negative Outcomes	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mostly positive.
Limitations (Authors)	For ethical reasons, it was not possible to assign the participants randomly to either a control group or the rehabilitation group. Consequently, a control group had to be constituted with participants who were a close-enough approximation of the rehabilitation group.
Limitations (Team)	1) Translation of the questionnaires from English into Tamil could have influenced the results; more details about the translation methodology are needed; 2) Not enough information on the samples.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

Kruglanski et al. (2014) evaluated the effectiveness of a Sri Lankan rehabilitation program targeting detained members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eedu (LTTE). The chapter outlines the preliminary results of an evaluation of six detention centers in northeastern Sri Lanka. The objective of the program was to disengage and deradicalize members of this extremist group by restoring their sense of significance, shifting their focus onto their individual selves rather than their group membership (through spiritual programs such as yoga and art activities that involved individual expression) and prepare them for their reintegration into society with vocational education courses. The authors constituted two groups to which they administered questionnaires about the following: **1)** organizational embeddedness (i.e., degree of personal involvement with the LTTE); **2)** perceived friendliness of the centers' personnel; **3)** degree of support for the armed struggle against the Sinhalese; and **4)** personality and demographic questionnaires (whose results were not discussed in the chapter). The first measures were taken in December 2009 and the second in September 2010. The first sample consisted of 1,737 males and 169 women ($n = 1,906$) who followed the rehabilitation program. All of them were detainees affiliated with the LTTE. The second sample was the control group, which consisted of 152 detainees from the Omahai center in Northern Sri Lanka, who, for logistic reasons, were not offered the rehabilitation programs (except for yoga and meditation). Data analysis showed four key findings: **1)** the participants' support for the struggle declined from December 2009 to September 2010 (statistically significant); **2)** the participants who had a higher embeddedness score also showed a greater attitude change; **3)** there was hardly any change in the control group; and **4)** the positive change in attitudes towards the center's personnel moderated the positive change towards the Sinhalese (those whose attitude towards the personnel improved reduced their support for the violent struggle against the Sinhalese to a greater extent—but not in the control group). No negative outcomes were reported by the authors. The study did have some limitations, however. As it was not possible to assign the participants randomly to either the control group or the rehabilitation group, the authors constituted a control group with detainees from another detention center whose characteristics were similar to those of the rehabilitation group. Nevertheless, they still had a higher mean age, lower level of education, and higher risk level than the rehabilitation group. Another limitation not mentioned by the authors concerns the translation of the questionnaires from English to Tamil—as translation could have influenced the understanding of the participants. Finally, the chapter lacks information about the sample.

Table 2.9—Summary of Evidence

Study	Webber et al. (2018) Violent nationalist radicalization
Program and Country	The Sri Lankan Rehabilitation Program, Sri Lanka.
Objectives of the Program	Increase the participants' sense of significance through six programs (spiritual, vocational, educational, psychological, social/cultural, and recreational) so that former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) members can reintegrate into society successfully.
Sample Characteristics	<p><i>Study 1:</i> 601 former LTTE members detained in rehabilitation centers across Sri Lanka. None of the 13 rehabilitation centers under study housed individuals determined to be at extremely high risk. In December 2009, the formal rehabilitation program had been implemented in 12 centers, reaching 490 individuals that constituted the full treatment group (mean age = 24.97 years old). The detainees were administered the six components of the Sri Lankan rehabilitation program: spiritual, vocational, educational, psychological, social/cultural, and recreational. At one remaining center, however, only recreation, family visitation, and meditation were offered (the "minimal" treatment condition). That center comprised 111 former LTTE detainees, providing the closest approximation to a control group (mean age = 29.19 years old).</p> <p><i>Study 2:</i> 333 individuals were recruited via chain-referral sampling: 179 former LTTE members who did the rehabilitation program (mean age = 31.15 years old, 94 men, 85 women) and 144 members of the Sri Lankan Tamil community (mean age = 30.33 years old, 58 men, 86 women).</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Study 1:</i> This study used a longitudinal research design. The same survey was administered three times over the course of one year of rehabilitation: on the start date, six months later, and after a year. The survey measured: 1) demographics; 2) attitudes toward deradicalization; 3) loss of significance; 4) extremism; and 5) level of LTTE embeddedness.</p> <p><i>Study 2:</i> A quasi-experimental, post-test-only design was applied to explore the reintegration of program participants into society. Both the former LTTE members who did the rehabilitation program and the members of the Sri Lankan Tamil community were surveyed once. All participants were rated on: 1) demographics; 2) loss of significance; 3)</p>

	<p>extremism; and 4) positivity towards the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan governments. The former LTTE detainees had additional questions regarding: 1) attitudes toward deradicalization; 2) deradicalization program involvement; and 3) LTTE nostalgia.</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p><i>Study 1:</i> 1) After a year of participating in the rehabilitation program, both the group that followed the program and the control group decreased their extremism levels—although it was significantly lower in the full-treatment group; 2) Insignificance played a mediating role in the relationship between rehabilitation attitudes and extremism. In fact, without feelings of insignificance, the relationship between rehabilitation attitudes and extremism was not statistically significant.</p> <p><i>Study 2:</i> 1) Compared to Tamil community members, post-rehabilitation LTTE members showed lower levels of extremism and higher levels of Sinhalese/Sri Lankan government positivity; 2) Insignificance played a mediating role in the relationship between rehabilitation attitudes and the following: extremism, LTTE nostalgia, and positivity toward the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan governments. In other words, rehabilitation attitudes affect the loss of significance, which in turn influences extremism, LTTE nostalgia, and positivity toward the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan governments; 3) Insignificance was decreased by greater involvement in the rehabilitation program. Improvement in significance was associated with higher positivity levels, lower extremism, and lower LTTE nostalgia levels; 4) The reduction in extremism that occurred during rehabilitation was maintained long term.</p>
Negative Outcomes	Implementation issues due to logistical difficulties (unreachable participants, transfers, and releases before the second and third surveys could be administered).
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mostly positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) LTTE stopped being an active extremist organization in Sri Lanka before the participants started the rehabilitation program. This makes it difficult to separate outcomes due to the program from those due to the group dissolution; 2) Even though steps were taken to reduce the social desirability of some answers, some participants may have toned down their responses.
Limitations (Team)	1) Program involvement was measured based on data reported by participants which could carry potential memory biases; 2) No mention of when the second study took place (i.e., how many years after the first one); 3) No details on the translation and back-translation process from English to Tamil (it is not clear whether scales were validated on the Sri Lankan population).
Quality of Study (/10)	10

This paper aimed to evaluate the outcomes of the Sri Lankan rehabilitation program for former members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). To achieve this goal, two studies were carried out. The first study was conducted among 601 former LTTE members and followed a longitudinal study design. Between May 2009 and December 2009, all detained former LTTE members went through a period of assessment and investigation to ascertain their risk levels. Risk categorizations were determined by three assessments, conducted respectively by the terrorism investigation division, criminal investigation division, and military intelligence of the Sri Lankan government. By December 2009, these assessments had been concluded in 12 of the 13 rehabilitation centers, allowing the rehabilitation program to begin. The individuals detained in these rehabilitation centers constituted the full-treatment group and were administered all six components of the formal rehabilitation program: **1**) spiritual rehabilitation (opportunity to attend religious ceremonies and rituals conducted by various religious organizations and access to yoga, meditation, and mindfulness classes); **2**) vocational rehabilitation (training in agriculture, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, wiring, motor mechanics, beauty culture, tailoring, and other regionally appropriate vocations); **3**) educational rehabilitation (beneficiaries under the age of 18 received formal education in a residential school environment while adult beneficiaries were offered classes in mathematics and reading and writing in Tamil, English, and Sinhala); **4**) psychosocial rehabilitation (psychosocial rehabilitation programs included theater, drama, dance, music, bibliotherapy, and creative writing programs); **5**) social, cultural, and family rehabilitation (participants could communicate with their family by phone or letters and family visits were encouraged); **6**) sports and recreational rehabilitation (volleyball, cricket, and board games were organized daily and detainees had the opportunity to do various arts, crafts, and home gardening). In the remaining rehabilitation center (the one that had not completed the assessment and investigation to determine risk levels of participants), only recreation, family visitation, and

meditation were offered. This minimal-treatment condition provided the closest approximation to a control group. Initial surveys indicated that detainees in the minimal- and full-treatment facilities did not differ on extremism, embeddedness in the LTTE organization, or months detained. Minimal-treatment detainees, however, were older and less educated than prisoners receiving the full treatment. To ensure that background differences between the groups were not affecting the results, analyses controlled for age, education, time detained, and level of LTTE embeddedness. Participants of both groups were administered questionnaires before the intervention, six months later, and a year later. Identical survey materials were completed at each measurement point to track attitude changes across time. Materials included a demographic questionnaire, items to measure embeddedness (i.e., the extent to which each individual and his or her family was integrated within the LTTE social structure), attitudes toward deradicalization (i.e., the extent to which prisoners felt like rehabilitation had been beneficial to them), feelings of insignificance (loss of significance), and extremism (i.e., attitudinal support for the LTTE ideology and approval of the use of violence to achieve goals). All materials were presented in participants' native language of Tamil after passing a rigorous translation and back-translation process to ensure that the items captured their intended meanings. Participants included in the analyses were those on whom data was available at each of these three time points. Therefore, the full-treatment group included 490 former LTTE members, while the control group constituted 111 detainees. Results showed that due to the increase in personal significance, participants in the full-treatment group expressed lower extremism levels after one year in the rehabilitation program. A decrease was also observed in the control group, but it was significantly higher in the full-treatment group. In the second study, 333 individuals were recruited via chain-referral sampling. A quasi-experimental, post-test-only design was applied to explore the reintegration of program participants into society. In total, 179 participants were former LTTE members who completed the rehabilitation program, and 144 individuals were members of the Sri Lankan Tamil community. Compared to their counterparts in the community, former beneficiaries showed lower extremism levels. Once again, personal significance was involved as a mediating factor. The authors found that positive rehabilitation attitudes decreased feelings of insignificance, which in turn increased positivity toward the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan governments while decreasing extremism levels and LTTE nostalgia. However, the authors mentioned as an important limitation that before participants had begun the rehabilitation program, LTTE had already stopped being an active organization. Therefore, differentiating the outcomes of the program from those of the group's closure remains an unresolved question.

Table 2.10—Summary of Evidence

Study	Bastug & Evlek (2016) Nationalist, left-wing, and faith-based violent radicalization
Program and Country	The Disengagement and Deradicalization Pilot Program, Turkey.
Objectives of the Program	Disengage individuals from terrorist organizations, shift their radical ideologies, and reintegrate them into society by counseling, helping them obtain a job, and receive healthcare, housing, and education.
Sample Characteristics	333 nationalist, 74 left-wing, and 48 faith-based militants.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	No information provided.
Positive Outcomes	1) Over 60% of the militants with whom program officers met decided to leave their violent extremist groups. Specifically, 226 of the nationalist militants disengaged from their group, and the remaining 12 decreased their negative activities. Furthermore, 33 left-wing militants disengaged from their extremist group (22 were new recruits), and the remaining eight lowered their engagement. Meanwhile, 20 militants of the faith-based groups agreed to leave their extremist group; 2) The majority of the families of militants supported the disengagement efforts. All the families of left-wing extremist militants, except one, supported the program. Out of 326 families of nationalist militants, 316 agreed to support the program and help officers to dissuade their children from remaining in the extremist group. As for the families of the militants in the faith-based group, 19 approved the program and assisted in program goals, while five rejected being part of the program.
Negative Outcomes	The program also developed a single disengagement approach and applied that approach to different types of extremist groups with small variations.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mostly positive.

Limitations (Authors)	1) There was no clear distinction between disengagement and deradicalization measures, with efforts usually overlapping; 2) There was no reliable data on the numbers of militants or ex-militants who were deradicalized; 3) Authors were not allowed to use individual-level data; therefore, an in-depth analysis was not possible; 4) As the dataset employed covered a single year, the results only reflect the outcomes that were achieved in year one of a six-year program.
Limitations (Team)	1) No information on data collection, measures, and data analysis; 2) Possible conflict of interest, as one of the authors of the paper was a member of the program team.
Quality of Study (/10)	5

Bastug and Evlek (2016) presented an examination of a Turkish pilot disengagement and deradicalization counterterrorism program conducted by the Adana Police Department in 2012. The purpose of the program was to reach out to members of extremist groups (left-wing, faith-based, or nationalist/separatist groups) and their families via phone interviews and in-person meetings to persuade them to disengage from their groups, change their radical mindsets, and help them reintegrate into society. The program comprised two stages. In the first stage, program officers contacted individuals who had recently joined one of the identified extremist groups. Through a phone call, at-risk individuals were advised to leave their group and meet with program officers to discuss the opportunity of entering a rehabilitation program (the family of the contacted individuals was also informed at this stage). The second stage typically took place when individuals were under arrest. Individuals were informed that if they accepted the idea of disengaging from the group, they would benefit from amnesty or obtain a concession from the prosecutor. Benefits included material and nonmaterial support, such as vocational training, employment, housing, healthcare, social and financial aid, counseling, psychological support, and treatment (the families of the individual were also engaged at this stage). According to the authors, the program resulted in positive outcomes: 60% of the militants with whom program officers met decided to leave their violent extremist groups. Specifically, 226 of the nationalist militants disengaged from their extremist group, and the remaining 12 decreased their negative activities. Of the left-wing militants, 33 disengaged from their extremist group (22 of these were new recruits), and the remaining eight lowered their engagement. Meanwhile, 20 militants of the faith-based groups agreed to leave their extremist group. It is important to note that the majority of families of the militants supported the disengagement efforts. Specifically, all the families of left-wing extremist militants, except one, supported the program. Out of 326 families of nationalist militants, 316 agreed to support the program and help the officers to dissuade their children from remaining in the extremist group. As for the families of the militants in the faith-based group, 19 approved the program and assisted in program goals, while five rejected being part of the program. Despite the positive results the research suffers from several limitations. First, there was no clear distinction between what was done to foster disengagement and what to achieve deradicalization. The efforts taken for these two counterterrorism measures usually overlapped. As a result, the researchers did not have reliable data on the number of militants or ex-militants who were de-radicalized. Second, the program developed a single disengagement approach and applied that approach to different types of extremist groups with small variations. Third, the authors were not allowed to use individual-level data, which made an in-depth analysis possible. Fourth, as the dataset employed covered a single year, the results reflect the outcomes achieved in only one out of the six years of the program duration. Finally, the authors' failure to provide information on methodology—including data collection, measures, and data analysis—and the possible conflict of interest due to one of the authors being a member of the program team present substantial limitations to the results of this study.

Mixed Outcome

Table 2.11—Summary of Evidence

Study	Davey et al. (2018) Islamist and far-right violent radicalization
Program and Country	Counter Conversations, England.
Objectives of the Program	Reach out to radicalized individuals via an online platform (Facebook) in order to engage with them and trigger their deradicalization and disengagement process.
Sample Characteristics	Islamist or far-right radicalized individuals were selected via a semi-automated identification methodology developed for this research. An algorithm combining machine learning and language processing was used to identify people who appeared to be using violent and dehumanizing language on Facebook. Experts and researchers from the Institute for Strong Dialogue (ISD) then reviewed the inclusions from the algorithm. Of the initial sample ($n = 814$), 569 individuals were contacted by the intervention providers with the aim of delivering an online intervention to initiate a process of deradicalization and disengagement. Most of the Islamist candidates were under 30 years old, and the majority of far-right individuals were over 45 years old. Gender and socio-economic status were not provided.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	To evaluate the program, the authors coded online conversations between the intervention providers and the radicalized individuals. The ten intervention providers were either professional counsellors, survivors of extremist violence, or former extremists. They were recruited and trained by the ISD. <i>Three indicators were used to measure the success of interventions:</i> 1) the initial response rate (i.e., whether or not a candidate responded to an outreach attempt); 2) sustained engagement (i.e., conversations of five or more exchanges with an intervention provider); and 3) potential positive impacts (i.e., indices that a conversation may have changed an individual's mind, made them admit their online behavior was harmful or led them to request to continue the conversation on another medium). All conversations were manually coded by two ISD researchers, with the third one providing a blind review. The effectiveness of different types of intervention providers was also tested.
Positive Outcomes	1) 20% of the candidates contacted by an intervention provider responded to the outreach attempt. This was especially true for radical Islamist individuals; 2) 68% of these candidates sustained the conversation for five exchanges minimum. Far-right candidates were less likely to do so than radical Islamist individuals; 3) A potential positive impact was noted in eight individuals, which represents 10% of the sustained conversations.
Negative Outcomes	1) Targeting radicalized individuals comprises risks (i.e., automation, legal liability, iatrogenic effects); 2) The workload for former extremists working as intervention providers was overwhelming, meaning that they were able to carry out fewer interventions; 3) Some candidates suspected they were being subjected to an intervention and responded aggressively or stopped the interaction.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) It was easier to find far-right candidates than Islamist extremists; 2) The identified public Facebook pages of extremist groups might not be representative of the whole spectrum of extremist ideologies; 3) Age is a confounding variable—technical literacy levels were not the same for younger and older candidates, which might have influenced the initial response rate; 4) The type of intervention provider had a significant impact on sustained engagement rates.
Limitations (Team)	1) Choice of the platform was influenced by the financial ties of the authors (i.e., the study was funded by Facebook); 2) Potential positive impacts were only evaluated once; 3) No differentiation was made between positive and hostile exchanges for measures of sustained engagement; 4) Individuals were not told that they were participating in the project.
Quality of Study (/10)	5

Davey et al. (2018) investigated Counter Conversations, a program from the Institute for Strong Dialogue (ISD) in England. ISD recruited ten intervention providers—either professional counsellors, survivors of extremist violence, or former extremists—and trained them. Using the Facebook Messenger application as a direct outreach tool, the intervention providers contacted 569 Islamist or far-right radicalized individuals in order to

engage with them and trigger a deradicalization and disengagement process. The intervention consisted of two reaching out attempts (in the form of unsolicited private messages sent by the intervention providers to the identified individuals) to initiate a conversation that could shift their attitudes and behaviors. In general, radical Islamist candidates were younger than their far-right counterparts, and this tendency was even greater for women. Of the extreme-right female candidates, 80% were over 45 years old, while 80% of radical Islamist female candidates were under 30 years old. As only public Facebook pages and groups could be identified by the ISD experts and researchers, and because supporting Islamist extremist ideologies is generally more marginalized (and therefore hidden), more far-right candidates were detected. Of the 569 contacted individuals, 112 answered, corresponding to a 20% initial response rate. Radical Islamist candidates were more likely to respond (26% responded; of these, 27% were men and 21% women) than far-right candidates (16% responded; 21% were men and 9% women). Of the 112 candidates who responded to the outreach, 76 sustained the conversation for five or more exchanges. The far-right candidates were less likely to maintain communication with the intervention providers (64%) than their radical Islamist counterparts (74%). A potentially positive impact was observed in eight individuals who engaged in sustained conversations. Conversations were also coded qualitatively by tone and content. Because the intervention providers were encouraged to experiment in their outreach attempts and adopt tones they felt comfortable with, the results did not indicate any significant correlation between message tone and sustained engagement or positive impact. In regard to the content of conversations, certain topics were more successful in generating responses, such as highlighting the consequences of negative actions and asking personal questions. Conversations that explicitly mentioned extremism were more likely to generate sustained engagement than those that did not. Despite numerous limitations, the outcomes of Counter Conversations were deemed positive by the authors. However, this conclusion has to be nuanced for several reasons. As mentioned by the authors, their identification methodology led to an over-representation of far-right extremists compared to Islamist extremists. The same was true for some age groups in relation to their technical literacy. Limitations not mentioned by the authors include measuring the potential positive impacts only once, making it possible that such impacts did not last over time. Another major limitation was the choice of an online platform, which may have been influenced by financial ties. Indeed, because the study was funded by Facebook, it is possible that the authors ignored two important limitations of the platform: the hidden second Facebook Messenger inbox for unknown contacts and the access to public pages/groups only. Finally, the decision to not inform individuals that they were participating in a disengagement and deradicalization intervention raised ethical concerns, especially considering the lack of justification provided by the authors. Intervention providers only notified individuals of their participation in the program if they specifically asked about it. Seven candidates asked this question, and only one maintained contact with the intervention provider after that. Nevertheless, research participants were deprived of their right to free and informed consent.

Table 2.12—Summary of Evidence

Study	Demant et al. (2009) Violent far-right radicalization
Program and Country	Racism & Extremism Monitor, Deradicalisation in Practice, The Netherlands.
Objectives of the Program	Prevent further radicalization and social isolation of individuals who show signs of being attracted to radicalized groups or, in some cases, have acted as followers. Prevent participation in or support of socially undesirable behaviors such as vandalism, acts of violence, and threats. Undo adverse effects that youths experienced as members of radical groups.
Sample Characteristics	<p><i>22 radicalized youth (21 male and one female between 18 and 20 years old) divided into four groups: 1) four participants were part of the Blood & Honour core (wore right-wing extremist clothing and were quite frequently in trouble with the police); 2) six were followers (wore right-wing extremist clothing but were rarely involved in criminal activity, if at all); 3) three were known to belong to the group; and 4) nine others did not belong to the group but expressed right-wing extremist ideas.</i></p> <p><i>Recruitment:</i> Some participants were recruited for the program through the Department of Youth Work or a police officer after having been in trouble with the law. Other participants were involved through projects run by Opmaat or by the Department of Social Services.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Trajectories of individuals involved in the project were observed by following the changes in violent radical behavior and its expression (as measured through right-wing extremist clothing, expression of violent extremist discourse, and contacts with extremist groups). In

	addition, an interview with one deradicalized participant was conducted after the end of the project.
Positive Outcomes	<i>Individual level:</i> 1) The program deradicalized two of the participants, with both leaving their extremist group; 2) For two others, the program was deemed as preventive, as these at-risk individuals did not end up in an extremist group; 3) For five other participants, there was some positive impact, as they agreed to stop wearing their right-wing extremist clothing to work or school. <i>Group level:</i> The Blood & Honour group had almost entirely disappeared from Winschoten by the time the project came to an end. However, this was partly due to an internal quarrel within the group.
Negative Outcomes	<i>For participants:</i> 1) Two of the four participants from the Blood & Honour core group stayed in the group at the end of the program; 2) One of the six participants in the followers group switched to the core group. <i>Program implementation:</i> 1) Lack of agreement on the definition of radicalization and deradicalization among program designers; 2) High variability of time invested by program providers.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Small sample size; 2) Allocation of participants into groups deemed subjective; 3) Lack of follow-up data on nine participants; 4) Difficulties in collecting information in the registration system due to compatibility issues; 5) Difficulty in differentiating outcomes stemming from the program from those related to the internal group quarrel.
Limitations (Team)	Limited information on data collection and analysis.
Quality of Study (/10)	4

Demant et al. (2009) reported on a pilot deradicalization project conducted under the direction of FORUM and Racism & Extremism Monitor in Winschoten, Netherlands. The project aimed to prevent further radicalization and social isolation of vulnerable youth and thereby inhibit participation in or support of socially undesirable behaviors such as vandalism, acts of violence, and threats. The sample consisted of 22 radicalized youth (21 males and one female, between 18 and 20 years old) who were either in contact with the Department of Youth Work or with the police after having been in trouble with the law, or were involved in the programs run by Opmaat or by the Department of Social Services. Four participants were part of the Blood & Honour core (wore right-wing extremist clothing and were quite frequently in trouble with the police), six were followers (wore right-wing extremist clothing but were rarely involved in criminal activity, if at all), three were known to belong to the group, and nine others did not belong to the group but expressed right-wing extremist ideas. The intervention consisted of a number of discussions between participants and authorities (e.g., the police, school authorities, the Department of Youth, the Opmaat foundation, social services, and parents) about right-wing extremist ideas and the consequences that such ideas might have for the participant. In addition, the authors interviewed one deradicalized participant at the end of the intervention. The authors evaluated the impact of the intervention based upon behavioral changes, as evident through the participants' decision to stop wearing right-wing extremist clothing, labelling themselves as right-wing radicals, and cutting off their contacts with the right-wing radical group. The results revealed mixed outcomes. At the individual level, the program was found to deradicalize two of the participants, with both individuals deciding to leave the extremist group. For two others, the project was deemed preventive, as these at-risk individuals did not end up in an extremist group. For five others, there was some positive impact, as they agreed to stop wearing right-wing extremist clothes at work or school. Contrary to these positive results, two of the four participants from the core group stayed in their respective group, while one of the six followers joined the core group at the end of the project. Meanwhile, the intervention had no impact on four participants, who either stayed in their respective group or remained at risk. Finally, for nine participants, it was unclear whether the intervention had any impact or not since no contact was made with them after the end of the program. At the group level, the Blood & Honour group had almost entirely disappeared from Winschoten by the time the project came to an end. There are substantial grounds to be cautious in reading the results of this evaluation. First, as the authors themselves acknowledged, the changes in participants' behavior may be due to external events such as internal disagreements that were present in the extremist group at the time of the intervention. Second, limitations such as small sample size, lack of agreement on the definition of deradicalization among the intervention providers, the unstructured

process for the allocation to groups, and technical issues relating to information collection present significant challenges in the applicability of the results. Lastly, the authors offered very limited information on their methodology for collecting and analyzing the data, significantly limiting the possibility of conducting an evaluation of the quality of the research.

Table 2.13—Summary of Evidence

Study	Schuurman & Bakker (2016) Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Dutch Reintegration Program, The Netherlands.
Objectives of the Program	<p><i>Main objective:</i> Deradicalize and disengage violent extremists and terrorists, thereby lowering their recidivism rates.</p> <p><i>Specific objectives:</i> 1) Reduce the chance of recidivism among extremist and terrorist offenders through specialized re-socialization and aftercare; 2) Expand the Dutch government's ability to monitor such offenders after their release; 3) Form a prevention-focused addition to the Dutch government's counterterrorism toolkit.</p>
Sample Characteristics	<p>Six Dutch Probation Service (<i>Reclassering Nederland</i>, RN) employees directly involved in the special consultation group, whose members are trained to become specialists in the reintegration of clients with a jihadist extremist background (<i>Bijzonder Casuïstiek Overleg</i>), and the project's liaison from the office of the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (<i>National Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid</i>, NCTV). One of the RN participants did not take part in the third round of semi-structured interviews because he was on sabbatical leave. No interviews with the clients themselves ($n = 5$) took place as their RN supervisors believed such talks could interfere with their reintegration work.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Three rounds of semi-structured interviews.</i> There were two parts to the study: impact evaluation and process evaluation. The focus of the interviews was to obtain the following: 1) the interviewees' perception of the project's effectiveness in lowering the chances that the clients would re-offend upon ending probation or parole and 2) the interviewees' thoughts on and experiences of the project's organizational implementation (i.e., how the reintegration process of their clients is structured, pros and cons of the approaches, potential problems or obstacles, and collaboration with other agencies).</p>
Positive Outcomes	<p><i>Impact evaluation:</i> 1) Three out of five clients seemed to be making progress; 2) One of them had successfully resettled, enrolled in school, adhered to parole conditions, and disavowed his previous convictions. However, this raised concerns among staff as he still had a tendency to view the world in black-and-white terms; 3) A second client had also adhered to his parole conditions and claimed to no longer see the use of violence in the Netherlands as justified; 4) A third client seemed to be less extremist than initially suspected.</p> <p><i>Strengths of the program:</i> 1) The one-on-one approach allowed the RN to tailor their work to the particular needs of the clients, provided the opportunity for a relationship of trust, and increased the likeliness that the RN employee would be able to see through deceptive behavior; 2) Growing recognition and appreciation for the project translated into an increased willingness among RN colleagues and key stakeholders such as the Public Prosecution Service to cooperate and coordinate with project staff.</p>
Negative Outcomes	<p><i>Impact evaluation:</i> 1) It was not possible to determine if the program was successful in lowering the chances that former extremists and terrorists would re-offend upon ending probation or parole because of the ongoing nature of the initiative, the absence of a control group, and the fact that none of the five clients had graduated from the program during the time of the study; 2) Two out of five participants left for Syria to join Islamist terrorist groups; 3) One of the participants showed no signs of deradicalization and had problems readjusting to family life after a long time spent in prison; 4) During the period of the evaluation, the project had not yet developed into a fully effective means for monitoring (former) extremists and terrorists upon their release from prison.</p> <p><i>Process evaluation:</i> 1) The fact that the Dutch government is relying in part on external deradicalization consultants formed a potential weakness in the NCTV-RN initiative, as it remains unclear who these consultants were and how they conducted their interventions. This made it difficult to evaluate their efficacy; 2) The NCTV felt that during the period of the study, the RN staff working on the project focused too much on the practical aspects of reintegration and too little on cognitive change; 3) RN staff appeared accustomed to thinking about recidivism reduction primarily in behavioral terms and were sometimes skeptical</p>

about the feasibility of bringing about deradicalization; **4)** The RN teams did not have the ability to manage the entire reintegration process on their own because the reintegration focused on the practical aspects of reinsertion into society. Consequently, the RN employees did not gain enough experience implementing the deradicalization side of the project; **5)** There seem to be additional challenges to the reintegration process when dealing with high-profile clients, as some government partners want to avoid political responsibility in case of mishaps. RN employees with clients who were not high-profile did not encounter this obstacle; **6)** The mental health personnel at the clinic where the clients were referred knew little about topics such as Salafi-Jihadism and terrorism; **7)** Three out of five RN employees declared that poor relations with their direct supervisor were a considerable obstacle; **8)** The RN personnel spent more time with clients who were part of the NCTV-RN initiative than is normally allocated and were not able to maintain the quotas demanded by their regular duties. This was a source of friction between the NCTV liaison and the RN employees; **9)** The Regulation on Sanctions for the Suppression of Terrorism was an obstacle to the reintegration of one of the clients, as it made it considerably difficult to open a bank account, own a debit card, or even gain access to income generated through work or acquired while on government benefits. This caused anger and resentment towards the Dutch government, which compromised the client's reintegration into society; **10)** More cooperation between agencies is essential.

Overall Outcome of the Program

Mixed.

Limitations (Authors)

1) It was not possible to use a control group of extremists and terrorists that were not enrolled in the initiative, so the authors had to rely on the staff's perception of the effectiveness of the measures taken; **2)** Some of the interviews took place with the program staff instead of the client, as their probation officer believed it would interfere with their reintegration work; **3)** Defining success was problematic; **4)** The RN clients had yet to complete the reintegration process or fully progress through the cognitive interventions intended to bring about deradicalization, making it impossible to assess the effectiveness of the program; **5)** Reaching a more conclusive verdict on the program's effectiveness will require continued monitoring.

Limitations (Team)

1) Very small sample; **2)** Insufficient methodological details about data analysis.

Quality of Study (/10)

8

Schuurman and Bakker (2016) evaluated the Dutch Reintegration Project in the Netherlands. The main objective of this program was to disengage and deradicalize violent extremists and terrorists affiliated with Islamist groups. More precisely, the program's aims were as follows: **1)** to reduce the chance of recidivism among extremist and terrorist offenders through specialized re-socialization and aftercare; **2)** to expand the Dutch government's ability to monitor such offenders after their release; and **3)** to form a prevention-focused addition to the Dutch government's counterterrorism toolkit. In order to assess the program's effectiveness, the authors conducted three rounds of semi-structured interviews with six Dutch Probation Service (*Reclassering Nederland*, RN) employees directly involved in the special consultation group, whose members are trained to become specialists in the reintegration of clients with a jihadist extremist background (*Bijzonder Casuïstiek Overleg*) and the project's liaison from the office of the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (*National Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*, NCTV). One of the RN participants did not take part in the third round of semi-structured interviews because he was on sabbatical leave. The evaluation process was divided into two parts: an impact evaluation and a process evaluation. Consequently, the focus of the interviews was to obtain the following: **1)** the interviewees' perception of the effectiveness of the program in lowering chances that clients re-offend upon ending probation or parole and **2)** the interviewees' thoughts on and experiences with the project's organizational implementation (i.e., how the reintegration process of their clients is structured, pros and cons of the approaches, potential problems or obstacles, and collaboration with other agencies). A few positive outcomes were noted in the impact evaluation: **1)** three out of five clients seemed to be making progress; **2)** one of them had successfully resettled, enrolled in school, adhered to parole conditions, and disavowed his previous convictions; **3)** a second client had also adhered to his parole conditions and claimed to no longer see the use of violence in the Netherlands as justified; and **4)** a third client seemed to be less extremist than initially suspected. However, both the impact and process evaluations showed negative outcomes. The impact evaluation indicated that it was not possible to determine if the program was successful in lowering the chances that former extremists would re-offend because of the ongoing nature of the

initiative, the absence of a control group, and the fact that none of the five clients had graduated from the program during the time of the study. Moreover, two out of the five participants of the program left for Syria to join Islamist terrorist groups. Also, one of the participants showed no signs of deradicalization and had problems readjusting to family life after a long time spent in prison. The process evaluation showed that the use of external consultants in the deradicalization process made difficult the evaluation of the efficacy of the program, as little information was available on these consultants. It was also noted that the RN staff in charge of both disengagement and deradicalization were working too much on the practical aspects of reintegration and behavioral changes and too little on cognitive change because they were sometimes skeptical about the feasibility of deradicalization. Consequently, the RN employees did not gain enough experience in the implementation of the deradicalization component of the program. Also, there were additional challenges for the RN employees working with high-profile detainees, as some government partners were afraid to take political responsibility in case of failure. Poor relationships between the RN employees and their direct supervisors, as well as the heavy workload, were also reported as obstacles by the participants. In one case, the Regulation on Sanctions for the Suppression of Terrorism was an obstacle to the reintegration of a client because it made it more difficult for him to access various services such as opening a bank account. According to participants, this caused anger and resentment towards the Dutch government and therefore compromised the client's reintegration into society. As identified by the authors, some of the main limitations of this study were the absence of a control group, the fact that the interviews were conducted with service providers and not the clients themselves, the difficulty of operationalizing success, and the short time frame of data collection. Limitations not mentioned by authors included the very small sample and lack of methodological details. In conclusion, according to the authors, it was impossible to determine clearly whether the program was successful or not.

Table 2.14—Summary of Evidence

Study	van der Heide & Schuurman (2018) Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Dutch Reintegration Program, The Netherlands.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Improve the reintegration of extremist offenders in the Netherlands by:</i> 1) improving efforts made to reintegrate terrorist prisoners while still in detention; 2) providing better aftercare upon their release; and 3) creating a central and coordinated approach for dealing with this offender class in the future.
Sample Characteristics	<p><i>1st round of interviews (n = 19):</i> 11 staff members, two managers, one policy officer, one <i>Reclassering Nederland</i> (RN)/Dutch Probation Service manager, three public prosecutors, and one policy advisor from the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism of the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security.</p> <p><i>2nd round of interviews (n = 21):</i> 13 staff members, five clients, and three employees of partner agencies closely involved in the reintegration work (the terrorist-wing of the Vught penitentiary/Hague municipality/Dutch Institute for Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology).</p> <p><i>3rd round of interviews (n = 19):</i> same participants as the 1st round of interviews.</p> <p><i>4th round of interviews (n = not specified):</i> staff from RN and various stakeholders in the reintegration process, such as individuals from the National Support Centre for Extremism and the municipalities of Amsterdam, Den Bosch, and Venray.</p>
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	<p><i>Data collection:</i> The authors used a longitudinal qualitative design consisting of four rounds of semi-structured interviews, which took place between May 2016 and April 2018. A total of 72 interviews were conducted. They lasted around two hours each. Researchers also had access to internal documents from the program.</p> <p><i>The evaluation of the program was divided into three parts:</i> 1) Program theory: uncover and evaluate the casual channels through which specific activities are thought to work to counter radicalization, the underlying program theory, the goals that were being pursued, the assumptions that were made regarding cognitive and operational logic, and how the organization measured success. Two specific elements were evaluated: cognitive logic (mechanisms assumed to make a particular policy effective) and operational logic (the degree to which the organization tasked with putting a particular policy into practice was actually suited to do so); 2) Process evaluation: assess the day-to-day implementation of the program; 3) Impact evaluation: assess the program's effectiveness in reducing recidivism among clients with an extremist or terrorist background, as perceived by staff members and participants.</p>

Positive Outcomes

Program theory evaluation: 1) Establishing a bond of trust was seen by the program staff as being essential to facilitate the analysis of the client, their social network, and their ideological views. Thus, one of the core principles of the team was to build a strong relationship with clients; 2) Collaboration was another key element according to the staff. Good working relationships were seen as enablers to effectively communicate with partners; 3) Even in the most complex and difficult cases where establishing a bond of trust was not possible, staff members believed that RN supervision allowed to provide some control over the behavior of individuals who could become a threat; 4) The program included prohibitions (i.e., meeting former extremist friends, visiting cities where extremist networks are still active, accessing extremist material online) to prevent clients from being pulled back into a radical group; 5) The program offered alternatives to extremism such as vocational education, internship, and work. It also provided alternative sources of self-esteem and direction in life, which is consistent with what is recommended by research in the field of disengagement; 6) The program is recognized for its relevant expertise and has been able to occupy the central role in the Dutch reintegration framework; 7) Overall, the cognitive and operational logic of the program was good.

Process evaluation: 1) Good working relationships within the team; 2) Supervising clients in teams of two was appreciated by staff members; 3) Staff members had access to a psychologist, which was seen as an effective way of dealing with the stress caused by the job; 4) When they faced difficulties regarding a particular aspect of their intervention work, staff members were offered training (e.g., training on the use of “inclusion” to address recidivism risk among extremist clients, training on the use of the VERA 2R risk assessment tool, etc.); 5) Cooperation between partner agencies appeared to be effective; 6) The program has undergone remarkable growth over the years.

Impact evaluation: 1) Of the 189 clients, only eight showed terrorism-related recidivism, and three showed non-terrorism-related recidivism. Compared to general recidivism rates in the Netherlands (45% for ex-inmates and 56% for juvenile offenders in 2013), the team's recidivism rates were very low; 2) Overall, the program appeared to be successful; 3) The behavioral aspect of the program (e.g., helping clients find jobs, proper housing, education, etc.) and participation in psychological therapies were both more effective than theological interventions or interventions aiming to change the clients' ideology.

Negative Outcomes

Program theory evaluation: 1) It was sometimes difficult to establish a strong relationship with clients as some of them were perceived as hostile or uncooperative. This made it difficult to keep working towards the goal of preventing violent radicalization and recidivism in a few cases; 2) The goal of preventing recidivism was too broad, and the program's definition of success was potentially misleading (i.e., no recidivism during parole or probation). It did not consider other important aspects such as progress towards disengagement or deradicalization; 3) The program did not include any risk measure to longitudinally assess the clients' views on the legitimacy of terrorism, and recidivism rates were not tracked after the completion of the program; 4) Serious challenges in terms of accurately defining success and gathering objective indicators of its attainment.

Process evaluation: 1) The program increasingly used external theologians as experts, which cost a lot and contributed to persistent financial shortages; 2) According to the program staff, overwork was a source of stress and dissatisfaction; 3) The staff could not keep seeing the clients for as long as they deemed necessary; 4) There were persistent financial shortages, partially due to the use of external experts who carry out many of the deradicalization interventions; 5) It was difficult to enforce some of the prohibitions because GPS tracking was not available in real-time. Consequently, the program's already overworked staff had to perform the time-consuming task of piecing together where the clients went. The same applied to social-media monitoring, as staff did not have access to specialized tools; 6) Legal boundaries had not been established regarding what the staff could or could not do (e.g., monitoring clients and sharing information with partner agencies such as the police); 7) Practical implementation of RN's theories about disengagement and deradicalization was challenging, as it is difficult to provide exciting and meaningful alternatives to radical groups. Jobs and schoolwork seem considerably less attractive; 8) It was difficult to provide a social alternative to the former extremist network of the clients; 9) The program staff felt they had a lack of expertise regarding ideology. Consequently, most of them did not address the clients' convictions and relied on external experts and theologians even though they received training on that subject; 10) Many staff members felt that a cognitive change was an unattainable goal and focused instead on

behavioral change; **11)** The staff did not receive any specific instructions about addressing the clients' ideology; **12)** No systematized approach was implemented within the team; **13)** Most of the employees stated that they had difficult relationships with the municipality of Amsterdam; **14)** There was competition between organizations with similar mandates; **15)** Some clients attempted to exploit the existence of similar organizations by refusing to work with one or the other, or by insisting on following the advice given by one, even if it were contrary to the recommendations of the other. This contributed to pitting one organization against another.

Impact evaluation: Eight clients showed terrorism-related recidivism and three cases showed non-terrorism-related recidivism.

Overall Outcome of the Program

Mixed.

Limitations (Authors)

1) Limited follow-up (recidivism was only tracked while the clients were under RN supervision); **2)** A number of clients were awaiting trial, which led them to display good behavior; **3)** A number of clients were reincarcerated after the follow-up period, which limited the recidivism rates found in this study; **4)** Many of the clients had not yet completed their supervisory periods at the time research was completed; **5)** Precise recidivism information could not be obtained by the research team or authors for privacy- and confidentiality-related reasons; **6)** Lack of objective metrics to assess success led to subjective evaluations based on the professional expertise of the RN staff; **7)** It was difficult to access and interview participants. Consequently, the evaluation was mostly based on the experience and opinions of program staff and key stakeholders; **8)** The recidivism rate of 4.2% should be interpreted with a considerable degree of reserve, as there is no data on recidivism after the RN staff stops monitoring the clients, and recidivism statistics do not speak to the deradicalization of participants; **9)** Because program participants were not accessible, the assessment was almost exclusively based on staff perceptions, opinions, and points of view, which introduced biases into the research.

Limitations (Team)

1) The authors did not fully describe their samples and there was no specification of the sample size for the 4th round of interviews; **2)** The program staff chose which clients could be interviewed by the researchers. Even though they had the clients' well-being in mind, there could be a selection bias (i.e., only choosing successful, less radicalized cases).

Quality of Study (/10)

9

van der Heide and Schuurman (2018) presented findings of an evaluation of the Dutch Probation Service's specialized reintegration program, *Reclassering Nederland* (RN), focused on individuals convicted or suspected of engagement in terrorism. The study involved four rounds of semi-structured interviews, conducted between 2016 and 2018, with program staff, clients, and key stakeholders. It consisted of a program theory, process, and impact evaluations. A total of 72 interviews, lasting around two hours each, were conducted. Even though the program was deemed effective in achieving its goal, the results of the evaluation were mixed. Program theory evaluation revealed that establishing a bond of trust with clients was essential to the program staff. It also revealed that good working relationships were a key element. The inclusion of "prohibitions" in the program was seen as relevant by staff members, who also stated that offering concrete alternatives to extremism, such as vocational education, was an important element. However, some parts of the program theory turned out to be difficult to put into practice. Staff reported that establishing a strong relationship with some of their clients was challenging, or even impossible, at times. It was also mentioned that some of the program's goals, such as "preventing recidivism," were too broad, and so was the definition of success. Regarding the process evaluation, there were more negative than positive outcomes. The positive outcomes confirmed good working relationships within the team. It also revealed that cooperation between partner agencies appeared to be effective and that the program had undergone remarkable growth over the years. Staff members were also offered training when deemed necessary. However, it was reported that the program staff was overworked, which was an important source of stress. The program also faced multiple financial issues over the years, partially due to the use of external theologians to carry out many of the deradicalization interventions. External experts were solicited because staff members felt they had a lack of competencies and knowledge about ideology, even though they received training on the subject. Enforcing "prohibitions" was also an issue for the staff, as GPS tracking was not available, forcing the already overworked employees to piece together where their clients went—which is a time-consuming undertaking. Also, providing interesting alternatives to extremist group membership was difficult in some cases, as finding a regular job can seem less exciting than

being “a holy warrior fighting an apocalyptic battle against the forces of evil.” Moreover, many staff members felt that cognitive change was an unattainable goal. The lack of a systematized approach to intervention within the team was also considered as a negative outcome. Finally, difficult relationships with the city of Amsterdam and competition between organizations with similar mandates were mentioned by some staff members. For its part, the impact evaluation showed mostly positive results. Of the 189 clients the program supervised, only eight showed terrorism-related recidivism, and three showed non-terrorism-related recidivism. Research on general recidivism in the Netherlands found that, for the year 2013, 45% of ex-inmates and 56% of juvenile offenders reoffended. In comparison, the program’s 4.2% terrorism-related recidivism rate and 5.8% general recidivism rate were very low. The behavioral aspect of the program (e.g., helping clients find jobs, proper housing, education, etc.) and participation in psychological therapies were both more successful than theological interventions or interventions aiming to change ideology. The authors noted several important limitations concerning the positive outcomes. First, recidivism was only tracked while the clients were under the program’s supervision; hence, clients’ long-term recidivism was unknown. Second, several clients were awaiting trial when the interviews took place. Therefore, they might have been incentivized to display good behavior with the hopes of positively influencing the trial. Third, a number of clients were reincarcerated after the follow-up period, which limited the recidivism rates found in this study. Fourth, many of the clients had not yet completed their supervisory periods at the time the research was completed. As the authors noted, especially because terrorism-related offenses tend to carry multi-year probationary periods, it was still too early to assess recidivism rates, even as measured within the confines of the program. Fifth, for privacy- and confidentiality-related reasons, precise recidivism data of participants could not be obtained by the research team or authors. These five limitations curtailed the relevance of comparing participants’ recidivism rates to those of the country. Another important obstacle was the varying views about what success looked like among the program staff. Due to the lack of an objective model to evaluate changes in attitudes or behaviors, the degree to which a client was deemed at risk of recidivism was exclusively based on the professional expertise of RN staff. Moreover, direct access to program participants was limited, forcing the authors to anchor their evaluation almost exclusively on staff perspectives. Despite the exhaustiveness of the report, some limitations were not mentioned by the authors, namely lack of details concerning sample size in the 4th round of interviews and the fact that the program staff chose who would be interviewed and this introduced selection bias in the research.

Table 2.15—Summary of Evidence

Study	Frenett & Dow (2015) Far-right and Islamist violent radicalization
Program and Country	One to One Online Interventions, UK and North America.
Objectives of the Program	Test the viability of an online approach based on directly messaging those openly expressing extremist sentiment online and seeking to dissuade them from following a path of radicalization.
Sample Characteristics	“Graph search” option on Facebook allowing to search users by demographic factors such as age, location, and relationship status, in addition to liked pages and group membership, was used to identify 154 Facebook profiles of individuals deemed to be at risk of carrying out violence in relation to their adherence to either Islamist or far-right radical ideology. Liked pages and group membership were the most relevant factors to identify the sample, but the profile picture and tone/content of their posts were also used.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	The intervention providers (former extremists) sent a total of 76 messages to the at-risk individuals identified on Facebook. The messages were sent through the “pay to message” function allowing users to message accounts they are not connected with for a nominal fee. Each message was unique and based upon the former extremist’s own intervention experience and personal background.
Positive Outcomes	1) The program showed promising potential for 60% of the sample in terms of long-term change in radicalized attitudes and behaviors; 2) The personal messages created a sense of trust for several candidates and helped them form a sustained engagement with 44% of the former extremists who chose to remain anonymous and 69% of those who revealed their identity; 3) At-risk candidates felt that the conversations led them “to think deeply” about their beliefs and conduct for the first time. They felt willing to explore alternative ideas and engage with the personal journey of former extremists.

Negative Outcomes	<i>For participants:</i> The former extremist background of intervention providers led to some negative reactions—most commonly anger and rejection—from candidates, who searched their stories online. <i>For program implementation:</i> 1) Intervention providers' concerns over personal safety and security, leading to one intervention provider leaving the project and three others choosing to interact anonymously; 2) Short duration of the program; 3) Limited budget.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Small sample size; 2) Restrictions resulting from graph searches and unexpected malfunctions on Facebook (especially with the “pay to message” function); 3) Removal of several profiles which were identified to be at-risk by Facebook during the recruitment period.
Limitations (Team)	Potential conflicts of interest, as the authors were part of the program.
Quality of Study (/10)	4

Frenett and Dow (2015) outlined the results of a pilot CVE project in the UK, undertaken by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue in partnership with Curtin University and members of the global Against Violent Extremism (AVE) network. The project's main objective was to test the viability of an online approach based on directly messaging those openly expressing extremist sentiment on Facebook and seeking to dissuade them from following a path of radicalization. The project team and 10 former extremists from within the AVE network (intervention providers) identified 154 Facebook profiles of individuals at risk of violent far-right extremism—in the UK—and violent Islamic extremism—in North America. The sample was identified through the “graph search option” on Facebook, where the most relevant factors were users' liked pages and group membership, as well as their cover photo and the tone and content of their regular posts. Over a 16-week period, the intervention providers sent a total of 76 messages—one per week—to the identified individuals, using Facebook's “pay to message” function. Each message was unique and based on the intervention providers' personal experience and background. The authors recognized that although the project was short-lived, it revealed that a sustained engagement (coded as exchange of five or more messages leading to a meaningful conversation) might produce a long-term change in behavior, provided there is trust between the intervention providers and the at-risk online profile users. For example, some users noted that the based-on-trust interactions they had with the intervention providers led them “to think deeply” about their beliefs and conduct for the first time. Other participants indicated a willingness to explore alternative ideas and engage with the personal journey of the intervention providers. Overall, the authors found the program promising—potentially impacting 60% of the sample towards long-term change in radicalized attitudes and behaviors. However, the interpretation of these results is limited for a number of reasons. As mentioned by the authors, the small sample size, short duration of the program, limited budget, and technological restrictions of Facebook were significant limitations. In addition, the authors evaluated their own program and did not discuss their methods of data collection and analysis, which significantly impedes the validity of their results.

Table 2.16—Summary of Evidence

Study	Manby (2009) Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Prevent (Diversity Group), UK.
Objectives of the Program	Provide training to support vulnerable individuals being targeted and recruited to violent extremism by engaging on the concepts of stereotypes, prejudice, racism, and discrimination.
Sample Characteristics	<i>Five youths convicted of racially motivated offences:</i> three of them were White (one male and two females, aged 14 and 15); one was a dual-heritage male, aged 14; and one was a 17-year-old British Asian male. Four participants (not the 14-year-old dual-heritage male) completed the program. One participant had dyslexia.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	1) Pre-/post-attitudinal questionnaires; 2) Planning and review meetings with Prevent's senior practitioner and team manager; 3) Interviews with one youth worker, three participants, and four Youth Offending Team supervising officers; 4) Observation of one session of the program. Questionnaires explored participants' views about immigrants and immigration, asylum seekers, integration, racism, and racist offences. The session observation measured

	participants' understanding of terms such as prejudice, stereotype, and discrimination. Interviews further explored the measures taken from the questionnaires and group sessions.
Positive Outcomes	1) The program was successful in targeting vulnerable young people at risk of extremism; 2) Group leaders were able to engage with key issues relating to racism, prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination; 3) The visit to the Holocaust Centre provided effective learning material for two of the male participants; 4) Participants showed evidence of understanding the concepts of racism, prejudice, and stereotyping.
Negative Outcomes	1) Three participants showed lower prosocial attitudes at the end of the program than at the beginning; 2) Two male participants, who were initially suspected to be less suitable for the program, disrupted sessions and activities with provocative behavior; 3) The dynamics of the group proved problematic due to differences in cognitive ability, age, and maturity.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Small sample size because of difficulties in obtaining referrals; 2) Lack of information on parental attitudes, which were a key factor for all participants; 3) Limited statistical power for quantitative analyses; 4) Some participants had mental health difficulties, such as dyslexia, that might have impacted their understanding of the questions.
Limitations (Team)	No explanation of a clear connection between understanding concepts such as stereotyping, prejudice, racism, and discrimination and recruitment into violent extremism was provided by the author.
Quality of Study (/10)	7

Manby (2009) examined the results of Kirklees Youth Offending Team's (YOT) Prevent program, Diversity Group, in West Yorkshire, UK. The program aimed at providing training to support vulnerable individuals being targeted and recruited in violent extremism by improving their understanding of the concepts of stereotypes, prejudice, racism, and discrimination. Five youths convicted of racially motivated offences, who were formally supervised by the YOT, were referred to the program. Three of these participants were White (one male and two females, aged 14 and 15); one was a dual-heritage male, aged 14; and the other was a 17-year-old British Asian male. All participants except the dual-heritage male completed the program. The program ran over eight sessions (six were group work, two were individual work, and one was a visit to the Holocaust Centre in Nottingham). Data collection encompassed pre-/post-attitudinal questionnaires, planning and review meetings with Prevent's senior practitioner and team manager, interviews with a youth worker, three participants, and four YOT supervising officers, as well as the observation of one session. Questionnaires explored participants' views about immigrants and immigration, asylum seekers, integration, racism, and racist offences. The session observation measured participants' understanding of terms such as prejudice, stereotype, and discrimination. Interviews further explored the measures taken from the questionnaires and group sessions. The results revealed mixed outcomes for the intervention. On the positive side, the program was successful in targeting vulnerable young people. Group leaders were able to engage with key issues related to participants' understanding of racism, prejudice, and stereotyping. The visit to the Holocaust Centre also proved to be an effective learning material for two of the male participants. Finally, participants showed positive evidence of understanding concepts of racism, prejudice, and stereotyping. However, contrary to these positive outcomes, three participants showed lower prosocial attitudes at the end of the program. Moreover, the dynamics of the group were problematic due to differences in participants' cognitive ability, age, and maturity, which at times led to disruptive behavior among the participants. The author suggested that external factors, such as participants' incomplete understanding of questions, recent life events, and mental health issues (e.g., dyslexia), might have contributed to the negative outcomes. In addition, the study had significant limitations mentioned by the author, namely, the small sample size, the lack of referrals, missing data on parental attitudes (a key factor for all participants), limited statistical power, and limited understanding of questions for some participants. As a final note, the author did not offer an explanation of a clear connection between understanding concepts such as stereotyping, prejudice, racism, and discrimination and recruitment into violent extremism. This limits the theoretical framework of the research.

Mostly Negative Outcome

Table 2.17—Summary of Evidence

Study	Anindya (2019) Violent Islamist radicalization
Program and Country	Rehabilitation and reintegration programs administered to Indonesian deportees in two shelters: Social Rehabilitation for Children Against Law (PSMP Handayani) and Protection House and Trauma Centre (RPTC), Republic of Indonesia.
Objectives of the Program	<i>Common objectives:</i> Facilitate the reintegration into society of Indonesian deportees who aspired to join the militant jihad in Syria or Turkey but were arrested before entering the country. Instill loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia through mandatory daily sessions delivered by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), Indonesian National Armed Forces, Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag), and former Jihadists. <i>PSMP Handayani:</i> Use interactive games and activities to prepare radicalized children to return into a non-radical environment. <i>RTPC:</i> Develop life skills through activities, in order to facilitate reintegration into society. Exclusively for adults.
Sample Characteristics	$n = 21$. 12 participants were personnel from civil society organizations (CSOs), three were government officials from the Ministry of Social Affairs and BNPT, three were researchers, and three were social workers. Gender, age, and socio-economic status were not provided.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	The author interviewed each individual on one occasion between November 2017 and July 2018. The interviews were recorded—with each lasting from 40 to 120 minutes— and later transcribed. Various topics were discussed during the interviews, including the role of CSOs in the program, information on the rehabilitation and reintegration programs, organizational aspects, and the coordination of relevant stakeholders.
Positive Outcomes	1) Social workers reported that after a few weeks, deportees usually became more willing to communicate with them. Children who refused to join activities at first often gradually participated and complied with the rules; 2) Social workers managed to gain the trust of most deportees by being available at any time in the shelters.
Negative Outcomes	1) No explicit guidelines were given in order to conduct the rehabilitation program; 2) Social workers were not trained for this specific population, which hindered the program's effectiveness; 3) The rehabilitation program lasted one month. This was too short for a therapeutic alliance to be built between BNTP officers and deportees; 4) Some deportees could not finish the whole program because shelters did not have the resources to keep them a whole month; 5) Deportees living together increases the risk of more radicalized individuals indoctrinating others (as was the case for children in PSMP Handayani); 6) Indonesian institutions consider themselves more credible than others, hampering interagency cooperation; 7) Many local communities do not want deportees to be sent back. Rejection from society could encourage some individuals to return to an extremist organization; 8) Threatening deportees to force a declaration of loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia is an unreliable way of inducing attitudinal changes because it can potentially fuel resentment against the government.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Using stakeholders instead of deportees leads to conflicts of interest because participants were involved in dispensing the program; 2) Because of the novelty of the program, no base rates were available for comparison.
Limitations (Team)	1) Findings are based on subjective perceptions of stakeholders with limited methodological details and were presented in an unconventional format; 2) No information was provided on how interviewees were selected; 3) Insufficient description of the rehabilitation program, especially in RTPC.
Quality of Study (/10)	4

Anindya (2019) described and evaluated rehabilitation and reintegration programs administered to Indonesian deportees who were arrested while fleeing the country to join the militant jihadi groups in Turkey or Syria. These programs were given in two shelters: The Social Rehabilitation for Children Against Law (PSMP Handayani) and the Protection House and Trauma Centre (RPTC). Both shelters were developed and implemented by the Republic of Indonesia's Ministry of Social Affairs (Kemensos). The shelters aimed to

facilitate the reintegration into society of radicalized Indonesian deportees by administering a one-month rehabilitation program. This program consisted of three phases: arrival, rehabilitation, and pre-repatriation. The arrival phase comprised an identification process and a risk assessment conducted by social workers and psychologists. During the rehabilitation phase, mandatory daily sessions were delivered by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), the Indonesian National Armed Forces, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag), and former Jihadists. In order to assess this program, 21 stakeholders were selected according to two eligibility criteria: 1) direct implication in the rehabilitation and reintegration programs (even if their involvement was minimal) and 2) expertise in preventing and countering violent extremism in Indonesia. The interviews were conducted by the author, lasted from 40 minutes to two hours, and covered a broad range of topics, including the content of the program, tasks of different stakeholders, and issues related to the radicalization process of deportees. No further details on the selection of interviewees were provided, introducing potential biases in the sample. The methodology was weak: The research question was not clearly stated, and there seemed to be a lack of depth in the qualitative analyses (i.e., findings were limited to a few selected quotes from participants that confirm the researcher's stance). While very few positive outcomes could be observed, negative outcomes were numerous. According to the author, implementation issues were mostly due to the "sectoral ego culture." In other words, cooperation between Indonesian institutions was hindered because each one thought they were the most credible one. This caused coordination problems between government officials and shelters and relentless competition between stakeholders. According to the author, the limitations were: 1) flawed data because no deportees were interviewed and 2) the active role interviewees played in the program might bias their answers. In addition, no recidivism base rates could be used for comparison due to the novelty of the intervention. Therefore, the evaluation was not based on program outcomes. Finally, forcing deportees to pledge their loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia in order to finish the program might not have been a reliable way to induce attitudinal changes. On the contrary, it might have increased negative beliefs and resentment towards the government.