

Extremism and Antisemitism: Pathways to Disengagement and Recovery, A Program-Based Practice Report.

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Abstract

Antisemitism remains a persistent feature across contemporary extremist movements, including far-right, jihadist, and certain far-left ideological ecosystems. This article examines antisemitism as a cognitive and narrative accelerant within radicalization pathways and explores how multidisciplinary, trauma-informed interventions may disrupt these processes. Drawing from intervention work conducted through Parents for Peace, we analyze two case studies involving radicalized adolescents whose trajectories included antisemitic ideation, online extremist exposure, identity-based grievances, and social isolation. We further examine the role of Exit Peer Specialists (“formers”) within clinically supervised disengagement models and discuss both the potential benefits and ethical challenges associated with former-led intervention work. Across the cases, antisemitism functioned less as an isolated prejudice and more as a mechanism for organizing grievance, moral certainty, and out-group hostility. Findings suggest that relationship-based interventions combining psychological support, family engagement, religious literacy, and supervised lived experience may weaken extremist identification more effectively than ideological refutation alone. We conclude with recommendations for integrating public health, trauma-informed care, and early-intervention frameworks into contemporary P/CVE practice.

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Introduction

This paper examines antisemitism as a recurring cognitive and narrative mechanism within contemporary radicalization pathways. Drawing from multidisciplinary intervention work conducted through Parents for Peace (P4P), we first situate antisemitism within existing

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literature on grievance-based radicalization, online extremism, identity formation, and conspiratorial thinking. We then examine the role of Exit Peer Specialists (“formers”) within trauma-informed disengagement models, including the ethical and supervisory structures required for responsible implementation. Finally, through two illustrative case examples drawn from P4P practice, we examine how antisemitic narratives emerged and intensified in these cases and describe the clinically supervised, relationship-based interventions used in response. Across these sections, we argue that antisemitism often functions not merely as a prejudice, but as a narrative accelerant that organizes grievance, identity, and moral certainty within extremist worldviews.

Antisemitism is a longstanding form of identity-based hatred that has evolved across historical and political contexts, including contemporary digital environments. Scholars have documented the central role antisemitic narratives have played across multiple extremist movements and ideological traditions, where Jews are often constructed as symbolic enemies onto whom broader social, political, or economic grievances are projected (Byington, 2019; Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2020). In this sense, antisemitism has frequently functioned as a recurring ideological scaffold within extremist worldviews, helping organize grievance narratives, perceived threats, and justificatory frameworks for hostility or violence.

For the purpose of this article we define extremism as the resulting ideological and psychological state in which beliefs and behaviors fall far outside mainstream societal norms, often advocating for measures that threaten fundamental rights or the safety of others (Trip, et al., 2019). Similarly we define radicalization as the process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors (Trip, et al., 2019). Disengagement refers to movement away from extremist involvement and violent behavior, which may or may not include complete ideological change (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). We use the term “formers” or “Exit Peer Specialists” to describe individuals formerly involved in extremist movements who now participate in prevention and intervention work. Trauma-informed care refers to approaches that recognize the widespread impact of trauma, prioritize safety, relational trust, and empowerment, and seek to avoid retraumatization while supporting recovery and resilience.

Article Scope and Methodological Status

This article is a practice-based program report drawing on the authors' professional experience within P4P, U.S.-based organization funded 10 years ago, providing prevention, intervention, and disengagement services related to radicalization and violent extremism. It is not an experimental study or systematic assessment of intervention effectiveness. The case examples presented below are used to illustrate clinical and programmatic observations arising from real-world P/CVE practice and to examine those observations in relation to the existing literature on antisemitism, radicalization, disengagement, trauma-informed care, and the use of former extremists in intervention settings.

Accordingly, the cases should not be interpreted as demonstrating the effectiveness of Parents for Peace or any specific intervention component. Rather, they are intended to identify practice-informed observations and potential mechanisms that warrant further empirical investigation. Where broader implications or recommendations are discussed, they are derived from the existing literature together with the authors' practice experience and should be understood as considerations for future research and practice rather than as empirically established outcomes of the P4P program.

Contemporary Antisemitism and Radicalization

Contemporary antisemitism encompasses both classical forms of Jew-hatred and newer ideological inversions. Farber and Fram (2024) demonstrate how contemporary forms of antisemitism often present themselves as denials of Jewish victimization, erasure of Jewish identity, and ideological inversions that recast perpetrators as victims. Similar concerns have also been raised within social work scholarship, where authors have argued that rigid ideological frameworks and reductive oppressor-oppressed binaries may contribute to the minimization of antisemitism, erasure of Jewish identity, or moral justification of violence against Jews in certain academic and activist contexts (Sousa-Meixell, 2025).

When looking at antisemitism through a framework of radicalization, antisemitism is particularly effective because it aligns with grievance-based pathways to extremism. Obaidi et

al. (2019) show that group perceptions of unfair and unjust treatment make people more vulnerable to extremism, which in turn manifests as aggression towards other groups. Thus, in the mind of the aggrieved, “justifiable anger” makes extremist action more acceptable.

The in-group/out-group bias, commonly understood as an “us vs. them” dynamic, is one of the most widely studied concepts in social psychology (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Humans tend to rely on quick cognitive shortcuts that sort people into groups, even when the criteria are trivial (Kahneman, 2011). Decades of research have shown that such approaches are exacerbated, triggering outgroup hostility, whenever there are any perceptions of scarcity of resources or competition for food, territory, mates, or safety (Sherif, 1966). Radicalization is commonly driven by a combination of personal vulnerabilities, social/organizational influences, and situational triggers. According to Binder and Kenyon (2022), radicalization is fundamentally rooted in the development of a “grievance-based perspective,” where individuals internalize narratives of personal or collective injustice such as perceived societal marginalization, cultural threats, or systemic oppression. These narratives may subsequently be used to justify violence as a defensive or morally necessary response. Based on this, radicalization processes are often reinforced by three interrelated psychological mechanisms: a profound sense of injustice, a clear powerful enemy, and moral certainty that attacking the enemy is righteous. This sense of having a single, comprehensive answer is immensely appealing to those experiencing grievance or cognitive distress. It simplifies a complex world into a binary struggle between “us” (the knowing, righteous group) and “them” (the Jewish conspiracy), paving the path toward an identity rooted in radical action as the only solution.

Antisemitism frequently provides a powerful ideological enemy that extremist movements can mobilize across different ideological contexts. For instance, in Nazi ideology, racial antisemitism represents the core doctrine, culminating in the Holocaust (Kauders, 2022). Similarly, in Islamist extremism (e.g., Al-Qaeda, ISIS), antisemitism casts Jews as a symbol of evil and a perpetual enemy using this narrative to mobilize violence (Rickenbacher, 2019). Antisemitism and antisemitic conspiracy theories create a narrative that covers all the ingredients as any grievance is turned into a “Jewish plot”. Whether it is Jewish bankers and the Rothschilds who are creating financial hardships for others while controlling the global economy or Zionist globalists and the Jewish lobby who benefit from wars, antisemitism

provides a simplified explanatory framework with one clearly defined villain. Although Jews make up only about 0.2 percent of the global population (Pew Research Center, 2025), conspiracy theories claim they secretly control banks, governments, media, Hollywood, and even both capitalism and communism. By adopting such narratives, radicals can cognitively flip the script from one of personal failure (i.e. I am unemployed) to a fatalistic injustice (i.e., the Jews are responsible for my economic downturn). Then, violence becomes reframed as defensive, morally justified, or necessary. Such moralism is psychologically addictive and socially rewarding inside echo chambers (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2024; Cinelli et al., 2021). Antisemitism can serve as an indispensable tool for channeling individual pain (trauma) and societal anger (grievance) into a directed target (scapegoat). As noted by scholars like René Girard, scapegoating is a persistent human dynamic, especially during times of social crisis (Girard, 1986). Throughout history, Jews have been consistently framed as the historically vulnerable scapegoated minority populations, as the stereotypes depict them as both too powerful (controlling finance, media, or government) and yet vulnerable (lacking a powerful national protector for much of history) (Anti-Defamation League, 2023). For the radicalizing individual, the antisemitic narrative provides an externalized cause for their failure, allowing them to blame it for poverty, a loss in social status, or unresolved trauma. Individuals who lack a sense of control, worth, or meaning may embrace radical networks that offer a path to (re)assert significance and control (Leander et al., 2020). In this framework, adhering to an antisemitic ideology becomes a means of self-affirmation and achieving a sense of purpose by aligning with a cause that claims to be defending the group (Leander et al., 2020). Furthermore, the in-group (the extremist community) is affirmed as virtuous, while the out-group (Jews) is painted as the invisible, all-powerful enemy responsible for the world's disorder. This is particularly relevant for those with mental health concerns or an absence of protective factors (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2022).

It is not surprising that social media, which allows people to be exposed to human beings across the globe, also creates an environment that exacerbates out-group hostility. Research shows that repeated and unchallenged exposure to hateful narratives, such as those on social and legacy media, desensitizes audiences to its harms and increases vulnerability to extremist beliefs (Madriaza et al., 2025), further showing how echo chambers and selective exposure

reinforces negative stereotypes and inhibits opportunities for corrective connection. Platforms like social media, gaming, and video-sharing sites are designed to maximize engagement in ways that reinforce existing attitudes and fragment information landscapes. This fragmentation is particularly troubling for radicalization and antisemitism. Research on American far-right and jihadist communities identifies how closed information loops strengthen polarizing narratives, with antisemitism functioning as a connective ideology that bridges non-violent and violent actors (Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2020). Antisemitic conspiracy theories become efficient recruitment tools precisely because they offer simplistic explanations for complex problems. The acceleration of radicalization occurs through multiple mechanisms. Schulze et al.'s (2022) longitudinal study of German movements such as Identitarians and Querdenken shows how fringe platforms accelerate radicalization by allowing conspiracy narratives, anti-elitism, and calls to violence to spread unchecked. Content exploits psychological vulnerabilities, uncertainty and trauma, shifting attitudes toward extremism, yet few public mental health interventions exist to counter this trajectory.

Platform architecture worsens the issue. Moderation is inconsistent on encrypted and fringe platforms (Telegram, Discord), while algorithm-driven amplification actively promotes inflammatory content. Hübscher and von Mering (2022) demonstrate that social media algorithms systematically elevate antisemitic material across ideological boundaries. Adolescents, the primary users of platforms like TikTok, are developmentally susceptible to such content due to heightened needs for social validation and identity formation (Erikson, 1968). Ideologically similar users cluster together, further insulating communities from contradictory information. Consequently, extremist content outpaces fact-checking and normalizes in mainstream discourse.

Antisemitism as an Entry Point

Antisemitism's ability to operate across divergent ideological systems makes it a uniquely potent mechanism of radicalization. Antisemitism functions as a central ideological bridge, or "lowest common denominator" across divergent extremist movements. Although far-right, jihadist, and far-left extremist ideologies differ substantially in their political goals, social

narratives, and justificatory frameworks, antisemitism provides a shared conspiratorial logic that enables cross-pollination of narratives, mutual reinforcement, and even operational learning (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Clifford, & Vidino, 2020). The horseshoe theory posits that the far left and far right, despite occupying opposite ends of the political spectrum, tend to converge in certain attitudes and behaviors, particularly in their shared anti-establishment orientation, use of conspiratorial thinking, and susceptibility to illiberal or extremist narratives (Bobbio, 1996; Dunphy, 2010). Rather than forming a linear continuum, the political spectrum is conceptualized as a horseshoe, with the two extremes curving toward one another and exhibiting overlapping patterns of radicalization. This framework is often used to explain why ideologically opposed groups may adopt similar rhetorical styles, scapegoating mechanisms, or antagonism toward mainstream institutions.

This shared fixation on Jews as a malevolent, omnipotent out-group makes antisemitism uniquely positioned to bind otherwise incompatible extremist milieus. In fact, reporting on U.S. extremist incidents illustrates that antisemitism often forms part of the ideological framework in domestic terrorist acts, even when Jewish people are not the immediate physical targets. In the aftermath of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, antisemitic conspiracy theories circulated widely online, with extremist forums invoking classic tropes that blamed Jews for orchestrating or benefiting from the attack (Anti-Defamation League, 2013). Although Jews were not the direct targets of the bombing, subsequent reporting indicated that at least one of the suspects had sought out *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a historically influential antisemitic conspiracy text (Haaretz, 2013). This distinction is important: antisemitism may function within extremist worldviews even when Jewish individuals are not the immediate targets of violence. In such cases, antisemitic narratives can still contribute to the broader ideological framework through which grievances, enemies, and violence are interpreted. More recent cases include a 2025 arrest in Massachusetts of a man who allegedly posted violent threats explicitly targeting Jewish women and synagogues as part of online extremist activity (ABC News, 2025), and a 2025 school shooting in Tennessee in which a teenage suspect was found to have posted neo-Nazi imagery and antisemitic content prior to the attack (NewsChannel5 Investigates, 2025). These incidents illustrate that antisemitic beliefs and threats frequently intersect with domestic terrorism and extremist violence in the U.S.,

reinforcing evidence that antisemitic ideologies often underpin or accompany acts of extremist violence even when Jewish individuals are not the direct victims.

Within far-right and White supremacist ideologies, antisemitism is foundational, racialized, and explicitly tied to narratives of demographic and cultural annihilation. Central to this worldview is the trope of Racial and Demographic Control, in which Jews are portrayed as orchestrating the “Great Replacement” or “White Genocide”, allegedly manipulating immigration policies, promoting “race-mixing,” and controlling global economic structures to weaken or destroy the “White race”. This conspiratorial narrative has been a direct motivator in multiple domestic terrorism attacks. For example, perpetrators in Poway (2019), Halle (2019), and Buffalo (2022) explicitly referenced antisemitic replacement tropes in their manifestos, framing synagogues or minority communities as immediate embodiments of a perceived existential threat (Rana & Lindsay, 2025). Thus, within the far-right ecosystem, antisemitism is not an ancillary prejudice, it is a core ideological engine driving radicalization and violence.

In jihadist extremism, antisemitism is framed primarily through theological and eschatological narratives. Jews are cast as an Enemy, an eternal, cosmic antagonist whose alleged corruption and malevolence is woven into sacred history (Rickenbacher, 2019). This framing transforms contemporary political conflicts into manifestations of an inevitable religious war, thereby legitimizing indiscriminate attacks on Jewish civilians and institutions worldwide. Such targeting serves the strategic jihadist aim of globalizing the perceived conflict between the Muslim ummah and its constructed enemies, including Jews framed as theological adversaries.

In certain strands of far-left extremism, antisemitism manifests through economic and anti-capitalist narratives. Here, Jews are portrayed as the ultimate Capitalist Oppressor, recycling historical stereotypes of financial manipulation, elite control, and exploitative power. In contemporary discourse, this often appears through the transposition of classic antisemitic tropes onto Israel or “Zionism,” where Jews are reframed as a monolithic capitalist force obstructing global liberation struggles. Vitriolic forms of anti-Zionism apply uniquely negative moral, political, or legal standards to Israel, frequently invoking imagery or accusations historically associated with antisemitism, such as control of banks, media, or global politics

(Anti-Defamation League, 2023). These narratives function as coded or euphemistic expressions of longstanding antisemitic conspiracies.

Recent analyses following the October 7th attacks further reinforce this pattern. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2023) documents that, in the aftermath of the attacks, extremist actors across the far right, far left, and jihadist spheres increasingly circulated overlapping antisemitic narratives, often borrowing tropes, imagery, and conspiracy frames from one another. This cross-ideological “convergence” does not imply equal levels of antisemitism across all groups, but it demonstrates how shared antisemitic conspiracy thinking can operate as connective tissue between otherwise divergent ideological ecosystems. In this sense, the ISD findings align with the modified horseshoe model: antisemitism functions less as an equally distributed belief and more as a common narrative infrastructure that enables disparate extremist movements to intersect, reinforce one another, and amplify collective hostility toward Jews.

Research on antisemitism within extremist contexts further shows that antisemitic beliefs often serve as a narrative crystallizer and cognitive accelerant within radicalization processes, structuring worldviews in both far-right and jihadist milieus and providing simplified, conspiratorial explanations for complex social realities that justify violence and dehumanization (Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2020; Byington, 2019). Conspiracy theories in particular are associated with extremist narratives because they “enhance the appeal” of extremist worldviews by supplying Black-and-White interpretations of sociopolitical events and attributing them to malevolent out-groups, including Jews or perceived Jewish influence (European Commission, 2021). Across extremist ideologies, antisemitism thus provides a unifying conspiratorial scaffold that sustains psychological mechanisms like grievance, identity threat, and perceived existential conflict, which are central to radicalization processes (Obaidi et al., 2019; Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2020). Recognizing this shared ideological structure is essential for understanding how disparate extremist movements interact with one another and how antisemitism fuels the broader architecture of violent extremism. In the cases presented below, antisemitism did not always precede binary cognition; rather, it appeared to accelerate and harden grievance-based identity structures by externalizing blame and simplifying moral complexity. This distinction is analytically important.

International Exit and Disengagement Landscape: The Parents for Peace Practice Model

Many initiatives have been developed to limit or prevent radicalization, known as “disengagement” or “exit work”. Certain countries have implemented state-led rehabilitation programs, such as the Mohammed bin Nayef Counseling and Care Center based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, whose aim was to return extremists to the “true Islam”. Notably, the Saudi model treats the involvement of an individual's family and wider social network as “a critical aspect of all Saudi rehabilitation and reintegration programs” and identifies it as essential to the program's success (Boucek, 2007). In other cases, non-governmental organizations have taken the lead in setting up mentoring initiatives, as we have seen with EXIT Sweden or EXIT Finland. While other countries have preferred hybrid partnerships between law-enforcement and clinical actors, notably the UK's Channel program, which combines police referrals with local authority support and clinical intervention. These programs differ substantially in their funding sources, target populations, theoretical frameworks, and integration of former extremists (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Altier et al., 2017; Clubb, Scrivens, & Islam, 2024). Most of these initiatives are not mutually exclusive and feed off each other. Parents for Peace drew insights from NGO-led initiatives such as EXIT programs to develop its own approach, hoping to fill a gap in the American landscape when it comes to radicalization prevention.

Parents for Peace is a non-profit 501(c) organization working to support families whose loved one has been radicalized or is on the path to radicalization towards extremist ideologies. Composed of a team of experts with mental and public health training, the team provides direct and indirect interventions through its national helpline. The organization itself was initially founded in 2016 by Melvin Bledsoe and his daughter Monica Holley. A few years before, Melvin's son, Carlos, had committed a terrorist attack against military personnel in front of a military recruitment center in Little Rock, Arkansas. His radicalization had gone unnoticed by the family despite his travel to Yemen to pursue a radical ideology. Devastated by the violent outcome of his radicalization, his father and sister decided to join forces and speak out, leading to the development of Parents for Peace. Initially designed as a “parent network” to exchange and raise awareness, the organization evolved into a national helpline whose goal was to provide advice and coaching to intimate bystanders struggling with the radicalization of a loved one. Parents for Peace developed its helpline approach by drawing on principles from addiction

recovery, trauma-informed practice, motivational interviewing, and relapse-prevention planning. These approaches were informed in part by literature identifying structural parallels between some features of radicalization and substance dependence, including social isolation, compulsive engagement, and difficulties associated with disengagement (Brown et al., 2022; Pacholska & Wojciechowski, 2023). This practical parallel, though not yet fully validated neurobiologically, informed their clinical approach.

A Cross-Disciplinary Approach

Such observations and findings have informed the Parents for Peace team to structure its interventions, which adopt a collaborative structure combining psychological expertise paired with the lived experiences of former extremists. Interventions typically occur weekly, last approximately one hour, and focus on addressing the underlying drivers of radicalization. Interventions are conducted by an Exit Interventionist (an individual with qualifications and prior training in a field of mental health: social work, trauma-informed care, psychology, etc.) with help and support from an Exit Peer Specialist (a “former”). Such design reflects the importance of lived experience as a gateway for connection and trust-building among participants: both the intimate bystanders and the individual of concern. As one of the goals is to change the pathway from hate and radicalization back to meaningful life based on connections and values that are healthier, Parents for Peace also provides family intervention, parent coaching and support groups for bystanders. The goal is to ensure a sustainable pathway back from extremism to a supportive family and community.

Parents for Peace operates within a multidisciplinary prevention framework informed by public health models of violence prevention. This framing does not conceptualize ideology itself as pathology; rather, it treats mobilization toward violence and identity-based harm as preventable social and behavioral processes, consistent with violence-prevention scholarship (World Health Organization [WHO], 2002; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2022). This distinction is important: the framework addresses pathways toward violence and harm rather than the legitimacy of political or religious beliefs themselves. In this sense, the public-health lens focuses on risk factors, protective factors, and early intervention

opportunities in the same way it is used in violence prevention, suicide prevention, and substance-use prevention models.

Given the complex needs frequently observed among the participants, the organization has established key partnerships with local resources for mental and physical health services. As many individuals experience psychiatric comorbidities (Misiak et al., 2019), ensuring adequate care is essential. Ensuring access to appropriate mental health care therefore remains a central component of the intervention model. As such, the helpline and care coordinator who oversees the onboarding and case management, regularly identifies and collaborates with local actors to support individuals suffering from mental health illnesses, homelessness or domestic violence. Collaboration with law enforcement also represents a key tenet of the model, to support the organization's duty to protect. Intimate bystanders may fail to identify warning signs of imminent violence or may seek assistance only when indicators have significantly increased. In such situations, having an established and trusted contact within law enforcement enables timely communication.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, P4P structures the involvement of formers within multidisciplinary clinical teams under professional supervision, rather than utilizing formers as independent interventionists. This structural choice directly addresses the documented risks outlined below. By embedding Exit Peer Specialists within teams supervised by licensed clinicians with expertise in trauma, identity reconstruction, and extremist disengagement, P4P seeks to mitigate risks of relapse, boundary violations, unresolved trauma activation, and unaccountable practice. This approach parallels supervisory models in adjacent fields (psychotherapy, addiction counseling, peer mental health support) that have developed over decades and shows promise as an ethical safeguard, though the adaptation to P/CVE contexts remains empirically understudied.

The Role of Former Extremists

In the United States and abroad, former extremists (“formers”) have become an important component of contemporary disengagement and deradicalization efforts. Research shows that pathways out of extremism often involve a combination of personal disillusionment, trauma, or

major life transitions that destabilize one's extremist identity, creating openings for exit (Barrelle, 2015). Reintegration, however, is complex and typically requires support across psychological, social, and structural domains, including mental health care, stable relationships, employment, and community acceptance (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). In this context, formers can play a distinctive and potentially valuable role. Their lived experience may provide insider insight into recruitment processes, ideological narratives, group dynamics, and the challenges associated with disengagement, which can support connection and trust-building with some individuals. At the same time, emerging empirical research suggests that former status alone does not automatically confer source credibility and that credibility may vary depending on the messenger, audience, context, and intervention setting (Koehler et al., 2025a; Koehler et al., 2025b). Research in educational settings has similarly highlighted the importance of careful selection, role definition, and attention to potential unintended effects (Gansewig & Walsh, 2022). These findings do not negate the potential contribution of formers as credible messengers; rather, they suggest that credibility is not inherent to lived experience alone and may depend on individual competencies, sustained disengagement, context, training, and appropriate professional oversight.

When appropriately selected and supported, formers may contribute meaningfully to prevention and intervention efforts through roles such as peer mentoring, public education, counternarrative development, and relationship-based engagement. Formers considered appropriate for these roles should demonstrate sustained disengagement, accountability for past harms, a stable nonviolent identity, empathy, and appropriate boundary-setting. Their personal experiences may help humanize the disengagement process, reduce stigma, and support motivation among individuals considering disengagement from extremist groups. Participation in civic engagement and public storytelling may also reinforce formers' own prosocial identities and support continued disengagement (Barrelle, 2015).

Despite these potential benefits, significant limitations and ethical concerns remain regarding the involvement of formers in disengagement initiatives, including questions about long-term effectiveness, relapse risk, unresolved trauma, boundary management, and potential unintended or iatrogenic effects (Gansewig & Walsh, 2022; Koehler et al., 2025a; Koehler et al., 2025b; Marsden, 2016). The empirical evaluation of deradicalization programs remains

inconsistent, with relatively few longitudinal studies assessing outcomes such as recidivism or ideological relapse (Altier et al., 2017). Ethical considerations also include accountability, public safety, and recognition that not all formers are appropriate for mentoring or prevention roles. These concerns underscore the importance of careful selection, clearly defined roles, trauma-informed practice, structured supervision, and ongoing monitoring when formers are incorporated into P/CVE interventions.

Because of the reasons outlined above and its consistent involvement of formers, Parents for Peace contributed to the development of a curriculum to establish norms and standards for the employment of formers within exit programs. In collaboration with Georgia State University, Parents for Peace spent two years developing the Exit Peer Specialist Curriculum. The development process involved several steps. First, Georgia State University conducted a job analysis of the Exit Peer Specialist position, identifying crucial knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics required for the job through interviews and focus groups with the intervention team. Based on these findings, Georgia State University drafted and finalized the curriculum. To complete this, the university obtained approval from an Institutional Review Board. A pilot was then conducted to beta-test the material. The resulting curriculum and its evaluation constituted a first step towards the establishment of norms and standards for the employment of formers within this space. Finally, Parents for Peace hired a trauma expert to ensure the protocols, policies, interventions, and support for staff are trauma-informed.

Clinical Supervision as an Ethical Safeguard in Former-Led Interventions

The cross-disciplinary model described above raises an important ethical question: given the documented risks associated with former extremists as interventionists, including potential re-radicalization, unresolved trauma, and boundary violations, what structural safeguards could be created to ensure that formers' participation strengthens rather than compromises intervention quality? Parents for Peace has attempted to address these concerns through a clinical supervisory model, which provides important context for understanding how the interventions described below were structured.

One way in which Parents for Peace seeks to address some of the ethical concerns that come up around the use of formers for interventions is by adopting and modifying the clinical supervisory model commonly used in mental health training. When conducting psychotherapy and addiction counseling, trainees and peer support workers usually operate under the structured supervision of licensed clinicians who provide case consultation, ethical oversight, boundary guidance, and risk management. One way to translate this model to P/CVE contexts is to embed formers into multidisciplinary teams to be supervised by licensed clinicians with expertise in trauma, identity reconstruction, and extremist disengagement (Meredith & Örell, 2024).

Thus, under such a model, formers would not function as independent interventionists. Instead, they operate more parallel to peer support specialists with a clearly defined and delineated role. As such, they can offer experiential insight, model nonviolent identity restructuring, and provide empathic engagement. In parallel to their work, clinical assessment and risk evaluation remain the responsibility of licensed professionals. Furthermore, regular case consultation meetings allow supervisors to monitor countertransference dynamics, boundary challenges, and emerging stressors. This structure is intended to reduce the likelihood that unresolved trauma, ideological residue, or personal identification with a client will distort the intervention process. Additionally, supervision provides an opportunity for discussing and processing complex transference experiences, as well as creating a structured space to identify and manage any relational challenges before they escalate (Budge, 2024).

Research on disengagement emphasizes that exit from extremism is rarely linear, and relapse prevention must be the cornerstone of any ethical engagement for clients and staff (Barrelle, 2015; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Accordingly, many scholars emphasize the importance of relapse-prevention frameworks, ongoing support, supervision, and long-term reintegration efforts within ethical disengagement programming (Marsden, 2016). Encouraging formers involved in de-radicalization work to receive ongoing mental health support would help mitigate potentially destabilizing factors such as life stressors, instability, and exposure to extremist content. By borrowing from the addiction recovery framework, relapse prevention in P/CVE contexts should involve continuous therapeutic engagement, regular structured supervision, clear reporting pathways for concerning behavior, and organized removal

protocols if identified risk concerns become unmanageable. Proactive support reduces the risk that any stressors or risk factors contribute to falling back on maladaptive coping. In order to mitigate known risks, programs could utilize a combination of clinical supervisory models, encourage ongoing mental health support, extended periods of demonstrated disengagement, and structured relapse-prevention planning. While such measures do not eliminate all ethical dilemmas, they serve to more closely align former-involved programming with established standards in adjacent fields such as addiction recovery and peer mental health support. As P/CVE initiatives continue to evolve, creating a professional structure for the involvement of formers grounded in supervision, accountability, and trauma-informed care would offer a pathway for balancing the potential benefits of lived experience with the goals to protect clients, communities, and the formers themselves.

As an example, Parents for Peace embeds formers within multidisciplinary teams supervised by licensed clinicians rather than utilizing them as independent interventionists. This structure allows formers to contribute lived experience, empathic engagement, and identity modeling while maintaining professional oversight around boundaries, risk management, and trauma-related dynamics. Although such safeguards do not eliminate all ethical concerns, they provide a framework for balancing the potential benefits of lived experience with responsibilities to clients, communities, and the formers themselves.

While existing literature provides important frameworks for understanding radicalization, antisemitism, and disengagement, fewer studies examine how these dynamics unfold within real-world multidisciplinary interventions. The following case studies from Parents for Peace illustrate how antisemitic narratives can emerge within broader vulnerability pathways involving isolation, identity confusion, rigidity, anxiety, and online exposure. They also illustrate how clinically supervised, former-informed interventions may interrupt these trajectories through relationship-based, trauma-informed engagement. In both cases, Exit Peer Specialists played an active role within multidisciplinary teams by modeling non-extremist identity reconstruction, challenging ideological distortions, and helping establish credibility and trust with the individuals of concern. The two cases are presented as de-identified, illustrative practice examples rather than as systematic or representative data. The case material derives from routine services provided through Parents for Peace and was not collected as part of a

prospective research study or formal program evaluation. All identifying and potentially identifying information has been removed, generalized, or modified to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the individuals and families involved. The cases are included solely to illustrate practice-based observations and should not be interpreted as research data, evidence of causal relationships, or evidence of intervention or program effectiveness.

Case Studies

Case number 1

The case concerns an African American adolescent raised in a devout Christian household who became progressively radicalized, notably through exposure to online extremist content. On the radicalization timeline, the first major incident occurred when the youth threatened a Jewish classmate, explicitly stating they were interested in committing violence against them. This verbal threat prompted a school safety response and a subsequent search of the youth's school computer revealed extensive jihadist content, including references to designated terrorist organizations, writings glorifying violence, and ideologically rigid theological notes copied from extremist forums. Shortly thereafter, federal authorities executed a search warrant at the family home, removing electronic devices and materials. The youth's private messages showed not only support for jihadist groups but also sustained antisemitic ideation, including admiration for attacks on Jewish institutions. Due to the nature of his threats, he was detained in juvenile custody for several days. Following release, the court returned him to his parents under strict supervision, implementing a structured home-security plan. The family, deeply Christian and unfamiliar with Islamic texts or practices, found themselves overwhelmed by their son's sudden preoccupation with extremist theology. They frequently sought guidance on which religious materials were safe, which interpretations were mainstream, and how to distinguish extremist propaganda from normative Islamic scholarship. Their earnestness and cooperation became essential to managing risk in the early stages. However, the individual of concern soon breached parental controls and restrictions, hacking into the home Wi-Fi system to gain access to jihadist forums and anti-Jewish content, leading to further prosecution. Ultimately, the case proceeded as a misdemeanor under a Treatment

Court model, where compliance, structured support, and behavioral change were emphasized. Restrictions were gradually eased as progress was demonstrated over the following months, leading to the removal of his ankle monitor.

Throughout this process, Parents for Peace (P4P) provided ongoing intervention. The primary interventionist engaged with the individual through a long-term, relationship-based model integrating multiple techniques: rapport-building, Motivational Interviewing, psychoeducation, religious literacy, emotional-regulation coaching, and theological guidance. Like many juveniles radicalized on the internet, he developed a worldview organized around sharp in-group/out-group boundaries, with antisemitism offering a simplistic narrative structure that reduced moral complexity and fed into grievance-based identity formation. The apparent function of antisemitism within this individual's radicalization trajectory is particularly relevant to the present analysis. Within the intervention team's interpretation of the case, antisemitism appeared to provide a named and coherent target for an otherwise diffuse set of grievances. The Exit Peer Specialist played a central role in the intervention team's efforts to reduce the individual's identification with online jihadist narratives. Because the Exit Peer Specialist shared lived experience with extremist ideology while embodying a nonviolent Muslim identity, the youth appeared more receptive to challenges that may otherwise have been dismissed as institutional or parental authority. The Exit Peer Specialist modeled ambiguity tolerance, identity reconstruction, and engagement with mainstream Islamic practice, while the supervising clinician maintained responsibility for emotional-regulation work, risk assessment, family coordination, and behavioral stabilization. Together, the multidisciplinary team worked to counter the youth's Black-and-White thinking patterns and extremist interpretations. When extremist influencers framed Jews as existential or transhistorical enemies the intervention reframed these claims through mainstream Islamic scholarship, highlighting prohibitions against harming civilians and emphasizing pluralistic traditions within Islam.

Sessions also focused on grounding the youth's spiritual interest in authentic religious study rather than online echo chambers. Carefully managed introductions to a local mosque and supervised peer groups provided healthier sources of belonging, gradually reducing the appeal of clandestine extremist networks. Over time, the youth exhibited meaningful progress. The antisemitic rhetoric diminished in frequency and conviction, and he showed increased capacity

to regulate intrusive thoughts. He formed healthier social connections, participated in prosocial activities such as animal-care work and structured youth programs, and demonstrated curiosity about legitimate avenues of Islamic learning rather than extremist content. While periodic relapses into absolutist or anti-Jewish thinking occurred, they became shorter, less intense, and more easily redirected through the established therapeutic and theological relationship.

The case provides an illustration into how juvenile antisemitism in extremist contexts often emerges not from coherent ideological formation but from online exposure, developmental vulnerabilities, and unmet social-emotional needs. This case illustrates one pathway through which antisemitic rhetoric may become embedded within a broader pattern of online exposure, developmental vulnerability, identity uncertainty, and unmet social-emotional needs. During the course of the intervention, reductions in antisemitic rhetoric occurred alongside increased engagement with prosocial activities, mainstream religious communities, family support, and emotional-regulation work. Because multiple interventions and contextual changes occurred simultaneously, the relative contribution of any individual component cannot be determined. The case therefore illustrates a multidisciplinary approach to disengagement rather than evidence of its effectiveness

Case number 2

This case concerns a White American juvenile whose pathway into extremism was driven less by coherent ideological conviction and more by a blend of social anxiety, isolation, and a search for identity in online spaces. The case first came to official attention when federal authorities contacted the youth's father after identifying a series of problematic online statements. These posts echoed jihadist rhetoric and contained hostile references to Jews and Jewish institutions. When confronted, the individual of concern insisted he was merely "trolling the FBI," framing his behavior as a game rather than a genuine expression of intent. However, the content of his remarks and the content and persistence of these patterns were consistent with features described in the literature on online radicalization. The adolescent subsequently claimed to have converted to Islam, but his religious engagement was almost entirely digital and conceptual. For a long period, he never set foot in a mosque, citing anxiety and discomfort in social spaces. His knowledge of Islam came from unvetted online sources, and his

interpretations were highly separationist: he imagined sharp boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims, and between “true believers” and everyone else. Within that framework, antisemitism functioned as a core organizing theme. Jews were cast as enemies, symbols of corruption, or legitimate targets, in line with the narratives he had absorbed from fringe propagandists.

A striking feature of this case was the way antisemitism manifested interpersonally. In one-to-one contact, the youth would often make graphic antisemitic jokes, references to violence against Jews, flippant comments about the Holocaust, or fantasies of humiliation and harm. These were not casual asides; they served as repeated “tests” of boundaries, a way to provoke, signal alignment with extremist milieus, and manage his own discomfort by turning hostility into dark humor. Each time, the interventionist had to push back clearly and firmly, challenging the content, unpacking its roots in propaganda, and explaining why such speech was both morally unacceptable and religiously invalid. The youth's baseline vulnerability was social anxiety and identity uncertainty, he was isolated, searching for belonging and coherence. Online jihadist spaces initially addressed these needs through ideology and community. However, abstract ideological critique (“Western civilization is corrupt,”) remained insufficient for producing sustained commitment or behavioral change. Antisemitism provided two crucial functions. First, it operationalized abstract ideology: instead of nebulous opposition to “the system,” the youth had a specific enemy (Jews) he could oppose through rhetoric and symbolic action, converting abstract ideology into a clearly defined scapegoat. Second, the performative function of antisemitic speech (making jokes, shocking the adult interventionist, testing boundaries, etc.) served a psychological function related to his baseline anxiety. By adopting antisemitic rhetoric, he could assert control, signal membership in a powerful (and thus anxiety-reducing) in-group, and manage his social anxiety through transgression and dark humor. One interpretation of this pattern is that antisemitic rhetoric allowed the youth to transform experiences of isolation and anxiety into performances of status, control, and belonging within an extremist-identified social framework. Within the intervention, the Exit Peer Specialist served a relational function intended to reduce the adolescent's identification with online extremist subcultures. The youth frequently used antisemitic humor and provocative statements as social tests, attempting to shock adults, establish control, and signal affiliation with extremist

online communities. The former's lived experience allowed these dynamics to be recognized not simply as "jokes," but as performative identity behaviors linked to belonging, status, and ideological experimentation. Within the multidisciplinary framework, the former modeled alternative forms of identity, masculinity, and religious engagement, while the supervising clinician addressed anxiety, rigidity, social withdrawal, and emotional regulation. The intervention model revolved around sustained rapport, structured challenge, and theological correction. Over time, the work combined several strands: (1) boundary setting around hate speech, with immediate, consistent correction of antisemitic jokes and slurs, (2) deconstruction of narratives, showing how extremist content misuses Islamic texts and how mainstream Islamic jurisprudence explicitly forbids targeting civilians or demonizing Jews as a group, (3) gradual exposure to normative Muslim life, encouraging the juvenile to move from an isolated, online-only "Islam" toward cautious participation in a local mosque, where behavior and teaching were more grounded, (4) attention to anxiety and social withdrawal, recognizing that his reluctance to attend the mosque and his attraction to hard-edged online communities both flowed from discomfort in real-world social settings.

Across months of contact, antisemitism became a kind of barometer of progress. At the outset, it was frequent, graphic, and delivered with a performative bravado. The juvenile seemed to enjoy shocking the interventionists, taking pride in how far he could go verbally while still claiming it was all a joke. As rapport deepened and the religious and ethical counter-narratives were repeated, the tone began to shift. The jokes did not vanish overnight, but their intensity reduced; they became less vivid, less frequent, and more tentative. The adolescent started to acknowledge, at least implicitly, that there were lines he should not cross. In parallel, his religious life slowly moved from pure theory to partial practice. It took him a very long time to attend a mosque even once, and he continued to struggle with consistency in basic Islamic practice such as daily prayers, community engagement, and routine acts of worship. Yet his efforts to try, however inconsistent, were significant. They represented a move away from the abstract, fantasy-driven Islam of online echo chambers and toward a more embodied, socially bounded version of the faith. That, in turn, created more opportunities to contrast the inclusive, rule-bound norms of everyday Muslim life with the dehumanizing rhetoric of antisemitic propaganda.

This case illustrates how antisemitic rhetoric may operate as an organizing and performative element within juvenile radicalization, particularly in online extremist milieus. For this youth, antisemitic humor appeared to function not simply as ‘edgy’ speech but also as a way of rehearsing extremist narratives, testing interpersonal boundaries, and asserting an oppositional identity. During the period of intervention, the frequency and intensity of these expressions decreased alongside efforts focused on sustained rapport, religious literacy, boundary-setting, anxiety, and real-world social connection. These concurrent changes cannot establish that the intervention, or any particular component of it, caused the observed improvement. Rather, the case provides a practice-based illustration of how multiple clinical, relational, religious, and social strategies may be combined when responding to antisemitic radicalization among adolescents

Scope and Nature of the Report

This manuscript presents a program-based practice report developed from within the operations of Parents for Peace. The cases described here are drawn from a retrospective review of previously completed program records and are presented to illustrate practice considerations, implementation challenges, and observations that arose over the course of service delivery. This report is not an experimental study or a quasi-experimental evaluation and it should not be read as such. It is important to distinguish between practice-based knowledge and empirical evidence. Practice-based knowledge, such as presented in this report, emerges from the accumulated observations of practitioners who work directly with participants over time. Such knowledge can be valuable for generating hypotheses, surfacing implementation challenges, and illustrating processes that may be operating within an intervention. The cases presented here were not selected, documented, or analyzed using a research design capable of supporting causal or evaluative claims. Accordingly, the observations offered in this report should be understood as illustrative rather than conclusive. Where the authors describe patterns observed across cases, these are offered as practice-based observations. The purpose of this report is to contribute practice-based insight which is grounded in direct programmatic experience. Such a

report may inform the design of future research, systematic evaluation, and intervention development in this field.

Discussion and Recommendations

This article conceptualizes antisemitism not merely as prejudice, but as a recurrent cognitive and narrative accelerant within contemporary radicalization pipelines. In the cases examined, antisemitic narratives functioned to (1) simplify complex grievances into morally legible conflicts, (2) externalize responsibility for perceived injustice, and (3) reinforce in-group/out-group binaries that lowered psychological barriers to hostility. Importantly, the cases presented here suggest that antisemitism does not necessarily initiate radicalization in every instance. Rather, it often functions as a narrative crystallization mechanism that converts diffuse grievances, identity uncertainty, or ideological curiosity into a coherent enemy-focused worldview capable of sustaining and accelerating radicalization processes.

Across these two cases, several recurring features were observed psychosocial vulnerability, such as isolation, identity uncertainty, trauma exposure, or unmet needs for belonging, often precedes ideological exploration, which then becomes structured and intensified through antisemitic narratives that simplify complex grievances into morally legible conflicts. Taken together with the broader literature, these observations support further consideration of earlier intervention within P/CVE frameworks: interventions must begin far earlier than current policy frameworks assume, and must be structured around multidimensional factors: psychological vulnerability, trauma, digital exposure, and social isolation. These vulnerabilities often precede the adoption of violent intent. Effective exit and prevention work cannot rely solely on law enforcement or policy initiatives. Rather, it requires trauma-informed, relational, skill-based interventions anchored in families, communities, and multidisciplinary support systems.

Based on the literature review, case examples and intervention experiences at Parents for Peace, we recommend that interventions aimed at Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) will include components that specifically target antisemitism as well. Current P/CVE frameworks remain primarily reactive, activating only when an individual nears

mobilization or when law enforcement thresholds are crossed. Practice experience within Parents for Peace, considered alongside the literature reviewed above, suggests that concerns may become visible through behavioral and emotional changes before an individual reaches a threshold associated with mobilization toward violence. At the same time, the actors most likely to notice these shifts (families, peers, school personnel, community members) currently lack resources, referral pathways, and guidance, and are absent from traditional security-based CVE structures. The Parents for Peace model offers one practice-based example of how early intervention, multidisciplinary care, and engagement with families and communities can be organized within a P/CVE setting. In addition, due to the rise of antisemitism across the world, as early as K-12, prevention and education in early age is crucial. Federal hate crime data indicates a more than double increase in bias related attacks from 2018-2022 targeting Jewish students in K-12 schools (Modan, 2024). The U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights reiterates ways in which antisemitic incidents in schools can violate students' and teachers' Civil Rights and may require enforcement under Title VI. Policymakers note that this growing and documented problem requires structural solutions (Modan, 2023).

Across both cases, antisemitism appeared to function as more than an isolated prejudice; it was embedded within broader dynamics involving identity, grievance, belonging, and moral certainty. The interventions therefore addressed not only ideological content but also psychosocial factors such as isolation, rigidity, anxiety, developmental vulnerability, and unmet relational needs. The observations from these cases cannot establish whether this multidisciplinary approach is more effective than ideological interventions alone. They do, however, illustrate the potential value of studying models that integrate clinicians, family systems, religious or cultural expertise, and appropriately supervised individuals with lived experience. Based on the literature reviewed and these practice-based observations, we offer four policy considerations for further study and implementation.

- 1. Expand and publicly fund early-intervention helplines as a national prevention strategy.**

Families and intimate bystanders are often the first to observe shifts in behavior such as withdrawal, obsessive online engagement, conspiracy fixation and more. However,

currently there isn't a safe pathway to seek help before escalation. The Parents for Peace helpline model, providing intake, indirect or direct intervention, and ongoing case coordination demonstrates a feasible early-intervention infrastructure. Integrating helplines into national P/CVE strategy may improve accessibility, reduce stigma, and create a point-of-entry prior to escalation. Federal or state-funded helplines modeled after crisis-line infrastructure would offer low-barrier access, clinical triage, and referral pathways long before violent intent forms. Embedding helplines within P/CVE policy frameworks would shift national posture from reactive to preventive.

2. Embed former extremists (“formers”) within formal P/CVE intervention systems.

Research in deradicalization consistently highlights the potential impact of credible messengers with lived experience in facilitating disengagement, increasing trust, and interrupting identity-based narratives (e.g., Barrelle, 2015; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The emerging practice model utilized by Parents for Peace incorporates formers as “Exit Peer Specialists,” providing peer-based support, digital counter-narratives, and motivational engagement; however, no national standards or credentialing pathways currently exist. P/CVE policy should formally recognize and fund the systematic integration of trained formers within multidisciplinary intervention teams, alongside mental health clinicians, educators, law-enforcement partners, and public-health actors. Streamlining training and implementing national credentialing standards, trauma-informed supervision, and ethical guidelines (including ongoing assessment to detect secondary trauma, burnout and risk) are needed to ensure accountability, minimize risk, and enable safe scale-up of this workforce.

3. Implement digital-literacy and algorithm-awareness education as an immunization strategy against antisemitic propaganda.

Given that online platforms act as accelerants (normalizing hate, lowering ideological thresholds, and facilitating cross-ideological convergence) P/CVE policy should invest in digital inoculation. This includes integrating conspiracy-resistance curricula and critical thinking skills into schools, training parents and clinicians to recognize digital

radicalization markers, and collaborating with technology partners to develop targeted counter-messaging slowdowns that disrupt extremist funneling.

4. Adopt a tiered public-health model to coordinate community, clinical, and security responses.

Historically, P/CVE efforts have been siloed, separating mental-health intervention from policing and community engagement from digital prevention. A coordinated, trauma-informed prevention framework drawing on public health models of violence reduction would align these domains by organizing intervention across three levels: (a) universal prevention through public education and stigma reduction; (b) targeted support for at-risk youth, marginalized communities, or settings experiencing heightened polarization (e.g., post-crisis campuses); and (c) intensive clinical and exit-intervention services for individuals at high risk of mobilization. The “Whole Society Approach for Early Intervention,” which incorporates mental-health professionals, school personnel, medical providers, family members, community leaders, and an intervention team, illustrates how such coordinated, multi-stakeholder action can reduce gaps between early warning, referral, and response while ensuring continuity of care.

Several limitations are important when interpreting the observations presented in this article. First, the article draws on two illustrative cases and therefore cannot establish causal relationships, estimate intervention effects, or support generalization to the broader population of individuals experiencing radicalization. The cases were selected retrospectively because of their relevance to the issues examined in this article rather than through a systematic sampling procedure. Second, the interventions were not conducted as part of a controlled study or formal program evaluation. Third, the authors are describing a program with which they have professional involvement. This insider perspective provides access to detailed practice-based observations but also introduces the possibility of selection, interpretation, and confirmation biases. We have therefore sought to distinguish descriptions of program practice from claims supported by the broader empirical literature and to avoid interpreting the cases as evidence of program effectiveness. Finally, although the article draws parallels with addiction-recovery,

peer-support, trauma-informed, and clinical-supervision models, the adaptation of these frameworks to P/CVE contexts, including the supervised Exit Peer Specialist model, remains empirically understudied. Future research should use prospective, longitudinal, and multi-site designs with clearly defined outcome measures to evaluate the feasibility, safety, effectiveness, and limitations of these approaches.

Summary

Taken together, these recommendations underscore a broader conceptual shift in deradicalization practice: from focusing solely on individuals already embedded in extremist networks toward addressing the earlier psychosocial, familial, and contextual mechanisms through which radicalization begins. The integration of formers, the establishment of helpline-based early-intervention access, the prioritization of digital-literacy initiatives, and the use of tiered public-health coordination may collectively contribute to a more robust prevention ecosystem, one that interrupts modern antisemitism-linked radicalization before violence becomes imaginable. Future research should evaluate long-term outcomes of multidisciplinary exit programs, including relapse trajectories, identity reconstruction processes, and the role of family-centered early intervention models. Ultimately, preventing antisemitism-linked radicalization requires more than counter-narratives or reactive security responses. It requires structured, multidisciplinary systems capable of intervening early, before grievance hardens into violent identity and before extremist belonging becomes psychologically entrenched. The cases presented here suggest that trauma-informed, relationship-based interventions that integrate clinicians, families, communities, and supervised formers may help disrupt these trajectories while supporting long-term identity reconstruction and reintegration. Prevention becomes possible when intervention begins at the stage where belonging, meaning, and grievance are still being shaped.

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