
Rise of Radicalization in the Global Village¹**Online Radicalization vs. In-person Radicalization - Is There a Difference?****By: Tanja Dramac Jiries²****Abstract**

In the vicinity of open space, some authors have called the “dark web” the perfect “breeding grounds” for generating conditions for seeds of extremism to thrive and grow. The perceived anonymity and vast information databases found here present a perfect incubator for terrorist activity. Academics and policymakers alike are as well convinced that such an open space filled with recruiter masterminds is perfectly adept at embracing the unadoptable, unconventional, or socially unfit into terrorist or jihadi organizations.

Nevertheless, regardless of organizations, modernization and adoption of new technological methods in which one can obtain ideas and information, many individuals are still and to a great extent, influenced by face-to-face interactions. Intimate environments of a religious institution, somewhat of a home-like feeling in community gathering center, can equally impact a person, as can the internet and its vast informational influence.

For the reason of contributing to understand the radicalization in the Global Village, this article will examine differences in online and in-person radicalization and illustrate it with some examples and attempt to make a comparison between two different exposures to information and its effects on young individuals.

¹ “Global village” is a term closely associated with Canadian-born Marshall McLuhan, popularized in his books *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (1962). McLuhan described how the Globe has been contracted into a Village by electric technology and the instant information flow across the Globe.

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Introduction

In the vicinity of open space, it does not come as surprise to call the “dark web” the perfect “breeding grounds” for generating the conditions for seeds of extremism to thrive and grow. The perceived anonymity and vast information databases found here present a convenient incubator for terrorist activity. Academics and policymakers alike are likewise convinced that such an open, unregulated space full of recruiter masterminds is perfectly adept at embracing the rejected, unconventional, or socially unfit into terrorist or jihad organizations. Utilizing social media is another very blatant approach to reaching massive amounts of people throughout the world for their support and being linked with like-minded individuals. This, in turn, leads to fundamentalism acting as a provider of strong meaning and identity for individuals and communities who may be experiencing a crisis in self-determination or may perceive that their cultural identities are under threat. “Ultimately, the mass appeal of fundamentalism is security in deeply insecure world.”³ Although, other forms of radicalization occur online as well, this paper will solely deal with radicalization through religious ideology, which results in violence. Specifically, this paper will dive into the emerging influence and importance of social media in the radicalization process, compare it to the more traditional in-person process, and offer conclusions as to what can be done to curb radicalization’s violent outcomes. Since “No Trespassing” signs are a rarity on the Internet, the “dark web,” is generally thought of as just that – an area off limits to even the most seasoned Internet users. Ultimately, regardless of the influence of various institutions, modernization and adoption of new technological methods in which one can obtain ideas and information, many individuals are still and to a great extent, influenced by face-to-face interactions. The intimate environment of a religious institution, which offers a homey feeling within a trusted community, can equally impact a person, as can the information on the internet and its vast resources and methods of persuasion. Oftentimes, an older person, who is perceived as a leader of a small community, is granted trust and is respected as a person of authority. For the reason of contributing to the understanding of the radicalization process in the “Global Village”, it is important to look for and examine differences in online and in-

³ G. Honor. Fagan (ed.), Ronaldo Munck (ed.), *Globalization and Security [Social and Cultural Aspect]: An Encyclopedia*, (Praeger, October 27, 2009) p.149

person (offline) radicalization patterns and illustrate them with a few examples in an attempt to explain their effects on young individuals.

Given that there is prevailing evidence that many foreign fighters that have fled to Iraq and Syria in the past five years had a very basic understanding of Islam as a religion⁴, this assessment will examine why then religion is often used as the main ideology behind recruitment, trans-identity shaping, and communal belonging, rather than the motive of violence itself. Furthermore, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all the tools used in recruitment and radicalization, hence it will focus only on the impact of social media (more specifically, on online propaganda disseminated via social media) as well as provide examples of in-person radicalization as a juxtaposition and a means of comparison amongst the two types of radicalization.

What is important to highlight is the fact that since 9/11, radicalization has been examined by researchers almost solely in terms of militant Islam, and this one-sided approach was mostly due to the fact that the use of religion as a driving ideology for terrorism has dramatically increased since 2000. Examination of the radicalization process in the past five years shows that the four biggest terrorist groups in 2013 are also the deadliest groups of the last fifteen years.⁵ What binds all four groups are religious-professed and driven actions.⁶ Encompassing and writing about all the different types of the radicalization processes, be it extremism on the left-right political spectrum, racism and other neo-Nazi groups, or any other

⁴ CNN, Christiane Amanpour interview with a French journalist Didier Francois who spent over 10 months as a prisoner of ISIS in Syria – “There was never really discussion about texts or it was not a religious discussion. It was a political discussion.” It was more hammering what they believed than teaching us about the Qur’an. Because it had nothing to do with the Qur’an. We didn’t even have the Quran; they didn’t want to even give us a Qur’an.” <http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/03/intl.world/amanpour-didier-francois/> (accessed December 21)

⁵ “Global Terrorism Index.” Institute for Economics and Peace. 2014. [http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global Terrorism Index Report 2014_0.pdf](http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf). (Accessed December 24, 2015)

⁶ These four groups are Al-Qaida, Taliban, Isil and Boko-Haram. Al-Qaida is a Salafi jihadist group inspired by the teachings of Wahhabism and seeks to use armed conflict to advance Islam. Taliban - Its beliefs are a mixture of Wahhabism, Deobandi, a form of Hanafi Sunni Islam, and Pashtun local tribe codes known as Pashtunwali. Isil The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has emerged as the largest Sunni terrorist organization active in the Middle East. ISIL became known for extreme violence and terror tactics as a major actor in the Syrian civil war in 2013 and with its rapid expansion into Syria and then Iraq. Boko Haram is a Nigerian based terrorist group founded in 2002. The name has been interpreted to mean ‘Western education is sin’ or ‘Western Civilization is forbidden.’ The group began as members of a mosque in the north-east which sought to implement a separatist community under Wahhabi principles.

non-religious radicalization is beyond the scope of this paper. As Dr. Schmid notes “it is difficult enough to reach modicum of agreement on Islamist radicalization.”⁷

Moreover, it is important to highlight that this paper is not about dissecting Islamist radicalization as a whole but looking into a type of radicalization that uses particular concepts of Islam as justification tools for violence. This paper will proceed in three ways: provide different views on the definition of radicalization and contextualize them within the domain of globalization, the Internet and social media. The radicalization process will henceforth be used only to refer to distinct type of recruits characterized by persons who are less integrated and whose radicalization results in violent acts of *solo-terrorism*.⁸ This will follow by the introduction of the different avenues of radicalization, focusing specifically on online and in-person (offline) influence and illustrating their effects with a few examples. Only a few examples of radicalization will be given, for it is beyond the span of this article to explore all possible channels through which young people turn to radicalized ideas. Lastly, conclusions will be drawn and certain recommendations for future research will be made.

Radicalization

*“Jihadists will be killed, only to be reborn again in future generations and raised on the same books.”*⁹

One of the key authors today that follows the phenomenon of radicalization is Jason Burke, who views that “every use of force is another victory for Bin Laden...thus, creating a whole new cadre of terrorists.”¹⁰ Similarly, Noam Chomsky quotes an Israeli think tank and Saudi intelligence, who both conclude that the “vast majority” of foreign fighters in Iraq “are not

⁷ Dr. Alex P. Schmid, Radicalization, De-Radicalization, Counter-Radicalization: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review ICCT Research Paper, March 2013

⁸ Special type of recruit refers to those people whose unaligned ideology with the one he/she exists within, results in violent actions of solo-terrorism (single terrorist controlled by organization), including bottom-up solo terrorism (single terrorist acting on behalf of network on his own) as well as top-down solo terrorism (single terrorist controlled by organization/network). This typology was devised by Danish Police Intelligence service, CTA found in Peter Nasser in “Research Note: Single Actor Terrorism: Scope, Characteristics and Explanations.” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 6, no. 6 (December 2012): 61-73. Accessed February 17, 2016. p.63.

⁹ Kamel Daoud. “Saudi Arabia, an ISIS That Has Made It.” *The New York Times*. November 21, 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/opinion/saudi-arabia-an-isis-that-has-made-it.html>. (Accessed December 30, 2015)

¹⁰ Quoted in Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2006. P.23

former terrorists”, but “became radicalized by the war itself, stimulated by the invasion (...)”.¹¹ The true effects of foreign military intervention on radicalization have been extensively explored recently.

For example, Pettinger notes that foreign military intervention causes backlash through terrorism, and the form of intervention affects what the output (of terrorism) looks like.¹² However, the main point of Pettinger’s study is that an individual’s propensity to engage in extremism is based on his or her level of de-pluralization - the developing perception that there exists only one solution, extreme violence - to take place¹³ - which determines the extent of radicalization. The growth of radicalized individuals after 9/11 has been the object of study for many authors, predominantly those in the West.¹⁴ However, as already stated, radicalization, even though extensively researched in the past 15 years, still does not have a unified, comprehensive definition accepted amongst scholars. As with the definition of *terrorism*, the term *radicalization* encompasses a wide range of concepts- from being used as a tool for marginalization by discrediting and side-lining certain groups of people, to embodying a dangerous path towards violent actions. The important difference talked about very often is whether all types of radicalization result in violent actions or not, and if not, why? According to Bartlett and Miller, it is the first step of all studies on radicalization to distinguish “radicalization that leads to violence (‘violent radicalization’) and radicalization that does not lead to violence (‘non-violent radicalization’)”.¹⁵ The authors conclude that only

¹¹ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2006. p.20

¹² Tom Pettinger, *What Is the Impact of Foreign Military Intervention on Radicalization?* 5 Journal for De-radicalization 2015, pp. 92-119, p. 110

¹³ Daniel Koehler. “Violent Radicalization Revisited: A Practice-Oriented Model – Analysis.” *Eurasia Review*. January 09, 2016. Accessed March 07, 2016. <http://www.eurasiareview.com/09012016-violent-radicalization-revisited-a-practice-oriented-model-analysis/>. accessed 07/03/16

¹⁴ See for example, Kim Cragin and Sara Daly, *The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World*, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, MG-246-AF, and Angel Rabasa, et al, *The Muslim World After 9/11*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004, Edwin Bakker, *Jihadists in Europe—Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in which They Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study*, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006.

¹⁵ Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller. “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24.1 (2012): 1-21. p. 3. According to the authors: radicalization that leads to violence (“violent radicalization”) is a process by which individuals come to undertake or directly aid or abet terrorist activity. Radicalization that does not lead to violence (“non-violent radicalization”) refers to

after the distinguishing these two types of radicalization, we can engage all economic, social as well as emotional (psychological reasons) reasons for radicalization.

Many authors, including Edwin Bakker, claim that the role of family and family ties are crucial for investigation of organizational approaches to radicalization. He concludes that social affiliation, the most crucial factor in this process, plays a role in radicalization that results in violence.¹⁶ Similarly, Christmann has found that a key component to becoming fully radicalized is having exposure to a network or a movement. Social network theory, resource mobilization theory and framing theory offer another approach to studying the radicalization process, one that links structural factors, group processes and individual motivations within an integrated analytical framework.¹⁷

To clarify further, this paper departs from the definition of radicalization given by C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko and more specifically, for the purpose of this paper we will adopt the 11th reason for Mass Radicalization in Conflict with an Out-group, which is Hate¹⁸. Moskalenko and McCauley argue that strong group identification is connected with higher levels of peaceful activism as well as radical action. Furthermore, the claim is that the Collective Phenomenon - seeing a group of individuals as a part of the “same kind” amongst members of a group or category, explains why groups share empathy with their own and dislike the others. “This is the emotionally laden sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded

the process by which individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo but do not undertake, aid, or abet terrorist activity.

¹⁶ Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study.” Clingendael. December 2006.

http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20061200_cscp_csp_bakker.pdf. Accessed February 28, 2016, p.51

¹⁷ Kris Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence.” Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. 2012,

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/396030/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf. Accessed February 26, 2016.

¹⁸ Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko, Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 20, Iss. 3, 2008. DOI: 10.1080/09546550802073367 (Accessed December 30, 2015)

In their study about radicalization, authors have defined several pathways of becoming a radicalized soldier. They have divided it into three sub-groups (Individual, Group and Mass). 1. Personal victimization 2. Political grievance 3. Joining a radical group—the slippery slope 4. Joining a radical group—the power of love 5. Extremity shift in like-minded groups 6. Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat 7. Competition for the same base of support 8. Competition with state power—condensation 9. competition—visioning Mass 10. Jiu-jitsu politics 11. Hate 12. Martyrdom.

group, involving both a felt solidarity or oneness with fellow group members and a felt group members and a felt difference from or even antipathy to specified outsiders.”¹⁹

The sense of discomfort with “the other” has been singled out to explain why young men and women choose to join violent groups in their pursuits of certain goals. Even though most certainly misapprehended, there is also a belief that volunteering for the cause is a fight for fairness against oppression. It is a conjured revenge against those imagined and real who have hurt the individual and who have brought on a sense of humiliation after the War on Terror after 9/11. “It is often observed that groups in conflict, especially if the conflict involves prolonged violence, become more extreme in their negative perceptions of one another.”²⁰ This tendency can become so extreme that the enemy is no longer seen as human. Dehumanizing the enemy or calling it “infidel” is one way of dividing people based on what is believed is just or not. Other authors, such as Doosje, Loseman and Van Den Bos argue that personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, and perceived intergroup threats are the main reasons radicalization appears amongst youth in the Western World. They claim that a “combination of these three factors can contribute to support for a radical belief system, and that this belief system forms the basis of attitudes toward violent behavior by other Muslim extremists, and ultimately, intentions to actually engage in violent behavior toward other people.”²¹

Today, the so-called state of ISIS, the Caliphate, is an arena where young men and women who flee to the promises of fighting for its cause can identify themselves with the very strict interpretation of Islam and the particular antipathy or even aversion and antagonism to “the Western ways of living”. The targeted outsiders are usually the Western liberal world. This is the simplified reasoning behind radicalization and a major reasoning behind what compels certain individuals to be radicalized over others.²² The agenda is to

¹⁹ Ibid, p.420

²⁰ Ibid, p.427

²¹ Bertjan Doosje, Annemarie Loseman, and Kees Van Den Bos. “Determinants of Radicalization of Islamic Youth in the Netherlands: Personal Uncertainty, Perceived Injustice, and Perceived Group Threat.” *Journal of Social Issues* 69, no. 3 (2013): 586-604. p.3

²² In a review of the literature around radicalization and young people we have come across studies on why for example, living in certain socioeconomic conditions as a racial minority has a positive effect on gang participation and engagement in violent behavior in American youth. One of them is the fairly old report from 1998 from US Justice Department, found on <https://secure.ce-credit.com/articles/101181/167249.pdf>, accessed 07/03/2016, or the new

segregate, isolate and offer alternatives to the presence and influence of “the other” that is usually led to be perceived as a threat. “Since ISIS is first and foremost a culture, not a militia, how do you prevent future generations from turning to jihadism when the influence of Fatwa Valley and its clerics and its culture and its immense editorial industry remains intact?”²³ Others are not quite so deterministic about the absolutist role of radicalization in its ability to lead to one specific objective, particularly violence. For example, scholar Sedgwick claimed that, simply put, the term “radicalization” itself is a source of confusion, hence the best solution for researchers is to abandon the idea that “radical” or “radicalization” are absolute concepts, to recognize the essentially relative nature of the term “radical,” and to be careful always to specify both the continuum being referred to and the location of what is seen as “moderate” on that continuum.²⁴ Sedgwick further claims that even though popular, the term “radicalization” itself is overlapping in its agendas of security, integration, and foreign policy. Dalgaard-Nielsen also greatly contributed to the debate about radicalization, from a social movement theory point of view to a socio-psychological approach. Scholar concludes that “the challenge of generating solid empirical evidence to enhance the understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization connected to militant Islamism is substantial.”²⁵

A popular claim seems to be that “fundamentalism appeals to the heart while disregarding the mind... [that] it is a cheap rabble-rousing pitch designed to seduce the thoughtless, ill-informed, disgruntled and frustrated masses with a set of simple solutions.”²⁶ It is important to note the terms like radicalization and fundamentalism overlap in many studies and are very often used interchangeably. “Religious fundamentalism has at its heart the ability to offer three things that are increasingly desirable for individuals and communities throughout the world as they confront modernization and globalization: meaning, identity and

one found at <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojdp/231116.pdf>, accessed 07/03/2015. This and similar reports show that there are a lot of similarities in issues raised over connection between young people and violence.

²³ Daoud, Kamel, “Saudi Arabia, an ISIS That Has Made It.” *The New York Times*. November 21, 2015.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/opinion/saudi-arabia-an-isis-that-has-made-it.html>. Accessed December 30

²⁴ Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 479-94. p.490

²⁵ Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 9 (2010): 797-814. p.812

²⁶ Robert Golden, *Windows kiss the shadows of the passing thirty million*, (Axminster: Triarchy Press, 2015), p.5

security.”²⁷ It was indeed argued that organizational membership accelerates the effects of religious identity on the individual-level, leading to radical and violent actions. Scholars like Hirsch-Hoeflera, Canettib, and Eiran have observed that contrary to the dominant belief that religious identity alone is ample to trigger violence, it is actually the role of organizational membership to tie religious identity with radical action. The authors have attempted to fill in the gap in related literature of a causal relationship between radicalization and actual violence, by claiming that organizational support is absolutely necessary to trigger violence. Similarly, Hoffman writes that “religious identity is a motivating factor for radical action, but it is the sense of belonging which serves as the trigger for radical action”²⁸ This claim is in apparent contrast to studies advocating the theory of lone-wolf terrorists and how they operate on their own and are not endorsed by any network or organization, but it further adds to the discussion about the complexity and multiplicity of factors to be taken into account when studying radicalization.

Now, it is very important to understand that there is a great deal of discussion that surrounds the question of whether “religion is simply a tool for mobilization or ... a primary motive.”²⁹ Many critical terrorism studies scholars (Gunning and Jackson, 2007) observe that the distinction is crucial and that “the religious label attached to terrorism is employed as a political tool in order to discredit certain ideologically opposing groups and their claims.”³⁰

Radicalization in the Global Age

When computers began to really take hold and became more affordable, so did the access and availability of the Internet. This, in turn, had created a much more globalized world with a multitude of opportunities to connect to every corner of the world. It had essentially created a borderless world where influence can be instantly transmitted transnationally with little to no oversight or restrictions. The physical and technological borders in

²⁷ G. Honor. Fagan (ed.), Ronaldo Munck (ed.), *Globalization and Security [Social and Cultural Aspect]: An Encyclopedia*, (Praeger, October 27, 2009) p.148

²⁸ Quoted in Hirsch-Hoefler, Sivan, Daphna Canetti, and Ehud Eiran. “Radicalizing Religion? Religious Identity and Settlers’ Behavior.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2016, 1-19. p.4

²⁹ G. Honor. Fagan (ed.), Ronaldo Munck (ed.), *Globalization and Security [Economic and Political Aspect]: An Encyclopedia*, (Praeger, October 27, 2009) p.378

³⁰ Gunning 2007 and Jackson 2007 quoted in G. Honor. Fagan (ed.), Ronaldo Munck (ed.), *Globalization and Security [Economic and Political Aspect]: An Encyclopedia*, (Praeger, October 27, 2009) p.378

the world have become thinner. Prior to the Internet, ideas could be controlled and censored and books could be restricted or banned - as has been done extensively throughout history. The limitation on information flow had enforced and strengthened our borders, kept us culturally sovereign and isolated, and more often than not, forced individuals to succumb to the prescribed identity to which they were born into. Since the spread of the Internet, this is no longer the prevailing reality in the world, as technology is widely available to spread information quickly and cost-effectively. Due to this, many ideologies can easily spread and take root in a number of culturally unrelated areas, tying diverse individuals from all over the world with common views and agendas in a matter of seconds. As a result, RAND³¹ researchers observed that, “the internet offers terrorists and extremists the capability to communicate, collaborate and convince.”³² According to the abovementioned qualitative study, it has been confirmed that the internet was widely prominent in the radicalization process of violent extremists and terrorists, and that “the internet has expanded opportunities for radicalization [by acting as]... a means through which to filter material that is consistent with one’s beliefs (the internet as an ‘echo chamber’).”³³ Another qualitative study by scholar Koehler has confirmed that “compared to other ‘socialization institutions’, such as offline group activities, music and concerts, rallies and political trainings, the Internet appears as the most important element driving individual radicalization processes, according to the used material.”³⁴

“The term *globalization* has come to be emotionally charged in public discourse. For some, it implies the promise of an international civil society, conducive to a new era of peace and democratization. For others, it implies the threat of an American economic and political hegemony, with its cultural consequence being a homogenized world resembling a sort of metastasized Disneyland (charmingly called a ‘cultural Chernobyl’ by a French government

³¹ RAND is self-identified as an “independent not-for-profit policy research organisation that aims to improve policy and decision-making in the public interest, through research and analysis”

³² Ines, Von Behr, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards, and Luke Gribbon. “Radicalization in the Digital Era.” *Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism*. 2013, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR453.html. Accessed February 21, 2016, p. 15

³³ Ibid, p.10

³⁴ Daniel Koehler, “The Radical Online: Individual Radicalization Processes and the Role of the Internet.” *Journal for Deradicalization* 1 (2014): 116-34, p.131

official)".³⁵ Often nowadays, we do not speak of globalization or the global age as a phenomenon, since it had taken root in world affairs and public consciousness perhaps even before the invention of the World Wide Web in the 90s. However, we can discuss the effects of "the Global Age" even today, as it shapes new phenomena or continues impacting existing phenomena', giving them a new form. Radicalized young people who are fleeing to Syria and Iraq as foreign fighters, in such higher numbers³⁶ are, for one, a cause for alarm. As Berger and Huntington observe, "we now have a picture of a cultural earthquake affecting virtually every part of the world ... (t)hen there are attempts at militant rejection, be it under banners of religion (Taliban) or nationalism (North Korea)".³⁷ Benjamin Barber portrayed that jihadi, or for that reason, any other isolated individual with antipathy against globalization (whatever its larger implications) who is on his or her path to shying away from modernity, identifies the self by contrasting it with an alien "other" and makes politics an exercise in exclusion and resentment³⁸. For the same reason Barber holds that Jihad³⁹ is at war with McWorld.⁴⁰

Similarly, scholar Appadurai notes, "there is growing evidence that the consumption of the mass media throughout the world often provokes resistance, irony, and selectivity. Terrorists are modeling themselves on Rambo-like figures (who have themselves generated a host of non-Western counterparts (...))."⁴¹ As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, so are the messages and actions of fundamentalists, which are more easily spread and are proving to be highly influential.

What particularly stands out about this is that although they are opposed to globalization and its sister trend modernization, radicalization recruiters did not fail to utilize

³⁵ Peter L. Berger, Samuel P. Huntington, *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. p.2

³⁶ To date, according Global Terrorism Index, drawn up by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) think-tank, up to 30,000 foreign fighters have gone to Syria and Iraq since 2011, (quoted in The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/30000-foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-2014-terrorism-report>),

³⁷ Peter L. Berger, Samuel P. Huntington, *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. p.9

³⁸ Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.

³⁹ This paper departs from definition of jihad as a "holy war undertaken by Muslims against unbelievers". The name comes from Arabic jihād, literally 'effort', expressing, in Muslim thought, struggle on behalf of God and Islam. Hence, the alienating "the other", starts self-identification through collective presence and imagery of a group that belongs to the jihadi cause

⁴⁰ Synonym for omnipresent American hegemony illustrated by the fast food chain McDonalds

⁴¹ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. University of Minnesota Press, 1996.p.7

the very first herald of technological modernization - social media. Not only did they not reject it or fail to utilize it, they sought to maximize its functionality by turning it into a powerful tool of communication in order to get their message across easily and systematically driving more people to their cause. Social media was ironically a Western invention that served as a blessing in disguise for the recruiters to spread their ideology quickly and efficiently; what would have taken countless media outlets (who would be willing to broadcast) to get their message across, now requires one smart phone and internet connection. The impact of mass reach through information brings to mind the Chinese proverb that says “kill one, make ten thousand watch”: this is exactly what the jihadi beheadings do now, although ten thousand has risen to ten million. Social media has proven to be a very powerful communication tool and community medium, perhaps even more powerful than the local imam or any local mosque one could go to for gaining knowledge and information. The mass increase of foreign fighters, who flooded and shaped what was at first a civil war in Syria, has been linked to the extensive use of social media in radicalizing people for the cause of the Caliphate. When and how did YouTube replace the pulpit, or does it only represent its reach of influence? It goes without saying that globalization and its effects had further accelerated fundamentalists’ actions, particularly through the global reach of the social media platform. Not only can their messages be spread easier, but there are also a few restrictions on censorship in worldwide media to classify questionable content and certain action as a terrorist threat, which could otherwise raise mass public hysteria. Further fueling the divide and adding to the security chaos, the influence of the media in inspiring even more young people to search for assistance and inspiration within groups that would embrace them for what they want to become- martyrs. Recruiters have utilized social media avidly, knowing the favorable outcomes of online recruitment; while under the wing of freedom of speech, they are ultimately using online space for promoting hate and violence.

Charles Taylor writes “all societies are becoming increasingly multicultural, while at the same time becoming more porous. Indeed, these two developments go together [...] means that they are more open to multinational migration; more of their members live the life of Diaspora, whose center is elsewhere.”⁴² These observations serve to prove how some

⁴² Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”,
http://elplandehiram.org/documentos/JoustingNYC/Politics_of_Recognition.pdf. (Accessed December 27, 2015)

immigrant communities, very notably in France, for example, haven't really assimilated, but in turn are still tied to their land of origin for the reasons of not being able to recognize or receive the imagined and expected benefits of multiculturalism that is at the root of the historical identity of their adopted host country.

Identity Search On-line – Self-Radicalization

The threat and likelihood of radicalization appears to have increased in today's global society. As expressed by Evan Kohlmann, international terrorist organizations can now reach individuals in remote locations around the globe through online training manuals, audio/visual recordings, and chat forums.⁴³ In fact, the latest statistics show that social media's influence on behavioral patterns in American youth, are at an all-time high.⁴⁴ Similarly, Brian Michael Jenkins observes that individuals are the most vulnerable "at a stage of life where they are seeking an identity, while looking for approval and validation. They are searching for causes that can be religiously and culturally justified, that provide them a way to identify who they are, and that provide a clear call for action."⁴⁵ Other authors have explored particular ways and pathways employed by terrorist groups to recruit or inspire people to carry on violence. Currently, there are a variety of tools, such as digital journals, that have inspired young people in the West to rebel against the contemporary order of things.⁴⁶ Designed to radicalize marginalized Muslims in the West and motivate them to initiate independent acts of terror, Inspire's (digital journal) message has resonated with a number of readers. Indeed, "only a few inspired readers would be needed to cause significant destruction and loss of life."⁴⁷ Inspire's target audience is made clear by its content, aimed at prospective lone wolf

⁴³ Shira Fishman, START Report, "Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security." START. February 16, 2010. Accessed December 31, 2015. https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf. p.8

⁴⁴ As seen in Howell, James C. "Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research and Programs." U.S. Department of Justice. 2010. Accessed March 07, 2016. <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojdp/231116.pdf>.

⁴⁵ Brian Michael Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment, Before the Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, United States House of Representatives RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT278-1.pdf (Accessed December 24, 2015)

⁴⁶ Susan Currie Sivek, "Packaging Inspiration: Al Qaeda's Digital Magazine Inspire in the Self-Radicalization Process." *International Journal of Communication* 7 (May 23, 2012): 584-606.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p.586

terrorists, primarily Muslims in the West who have feelings of subordination in their countries of current residence. This individual might fit the ‘Loner’ description in Pantucci’s typology (2011) of lone wolf terrorists: “an individual who plans or attempts to carry out an act of terrorism using the cover of extreme Islamist ideology . . . [without] any actual connection or contact with extremists—beyond what they are able to access through passive consumption on the Internet or from society at large.”⁴⁸ Probably the highest rate of success in recruitment and radicalization has been ascribed to the online propaganda of a journal called Dabiq, which is published in multiple languages⁴⁹. It is extremely well-organized and sophisticated, disseminating its message of radicalization in several language editions and receiving much attention, especially in its success of luring young people to join the so-called Islamic State.

In general, the Internet’s role in self-radicalization is becoming clearer. Some authors (i.e. Musa and Bendett, 2010) trace an increase in terrorist plots by individuals who were inspired by the media, who sought out like-minded individuals online, did not participate in a face-to-face Muslim community, and lacked a strong interpersonal connection to a terrorist network.⁵⁰ In these cases—as with Pantucci’s loners’ explanation—Internet media was the primary or sole link to jihad ideology and information. To explain these individuals’ involvement into prospective terrorists, Helfstein (2012) offers a useful model of the self-radicalization process with four stages: Awareness, Interest, Acceptance, and Implementation. In Helfstein’s model, awareness is a long-term process that occurs over time as an individual’s knowledge of radical ideology and tactics deepens. Interest in this model consists of more than just curiosity; it also includes “the willingness to alter one’s belief system or social norms to reflect those associated with an ideological doctrine.”⁵¹ When a potential “lone wolf” becomes lured by jihad under this model, he or she can more easily integrate jihadist ideology into his or her own thinking. Acceptance is the final assimilation of radical

⁴⁸ Pantucci’s typology (2011) quoted in Susan Currie Sivek, “Packaging Inspiration: Al Qaeda’s Digital Magazine Inspire in the Self-Radicalization Process.” *International Journal of Communication* 7 (May 23, 2012): 584-606. p.6

⁴⁹ Terrence, McCoy, “The Apocalyptic Magazine the Islamic State Uses to Recruit and Radicalize Foreigners.” Washington Post. September 16, 2014.. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/16/the-apocalyptic-magazine-the-islamic-state-uses-to-recruit-and-radicalize-foreigners/>. Accessed February 22, 2016

⁵⁰ Musa and Bendett quoted in Susan Currie Sivek, “Packaging Inspiration: Al Qaeda’s Digital Magazine Inspire in the Self-Radicalization Process.” *International Journal of Communication* 7 (May 23, 2012): 584-606. p.7

⁵¹ Scott Helfstein, Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism The Combating terrorism Center at West Point, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CTC_EdgesofRadicalization.pdf, 2012, p. 16

ideas and norms into a recruit's thought processes. Recruits to violent causes must readily accept the necessity of violence to achieve sociopolitical goals and enact radical ideology. Only then can the newly radicalized individual follow through on the implementation of a violent act. Helfstein states that current evidence shows that self-radicalization is not a linear process but rather an incremental development within an individual that may contain feedback loops. Moreover, this long-term process can be either interrupted or reinforced by outside factors, including the individuals themselves.

Some people become aware and interested but don't complete the acceptance process "without greater exposure to new information and social relationships"; furthermore, 'interested parties' may intervene to support or discourage radicalization"⁵² Some segments of the process are also easier to complete. Helfstein argues that developing awareness is relatively simple, but gaining deeper interest in acting on ideological impulses is more challenging. The movement from interest to acceptance is especially difficult. However, terror propagandists are well aware of the challenges of this self-radicalization process. Helfstein notes that much of the recruitment messaging focuses on moving prospective participants from interest to acceptance, because following acceptance, there is "a tendency to reduce cognitive dissonance"⁵³ by proceeding directly to violent action. Once at acceptance, the recruit must act violently to embody his or her new perspective.

In-Person Radicalization

Contrary to what some authors believe about the power of interconnectivity in the digital age and its role in accelerating radical ideas, other authors believe that it is the local, in-person contact that ultimately leads to a successful radicalization process characterized by violent action. Many scholars of this persuasion will highlight that the vast majority of people can solely sustain their radical ideas by visiting right-wing websites, but would never be propelled to act on them, whereas if they engage in a local community and are exposed to local Muslim bookstores, hookah bars, mosques, virtually anywhere where radical Muslims congregate in person, it is more likely that their radicalization process will eventually lead to a tangible participation in the fundamentalist struggle. Authors like Alison Pargeter have

⁵² Ibid, p.17

⁵³ Ibid, p.19

explored the role of localism and radicalization that had no or very limited contact with possible recruiters. For her research, Pargeter observed neglected, poor and small communities in Morocco, Libya and Tunisia for their increased Islamic militarization and found the following: “Given that these regions have produced Islamists in numbers disproportionate to the size of their populations, it would seem that this conservative mindset found it especially difficult to adapt to the shock of modernization engendered by the colonial and post-independence periods.”⁵⁴ Parger also notes that “one should not be too reductionist: the nexus between Islamism and local issues cannot explain radicalization per se”, and that, in fact, “individuals’ motivations for taking up radical action are always multifaceted.”⁵⁵

Unlike the online process, in-person radicalization encompasses everything but anonymity. Young people who participate in local community center activities are present to the teachings, lessons and simple ceremonial activities, which allows for a more personal level of influence than what the Internet can offer. In some countries, the contact with former foreign fighters and “martyrs” is considered to be a significant indicator of the power of in-person interaction and influence. For example, just in the past year, Bosnia and Herzegovina officials had arrested dozens of people on the suspicion of having traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight alongside ISIS, or who were suspected to be providing the Sunni militant group with weapons and cash.⁵⁶ Last year, Bosnia passed a law that bans citizens from fighting in foreign countries. “The appearance of young radicalized Bosnian Muslims will only add to those tensions, and further prevent Bosnia from starting to move toward NATO and EU integration.”⁵⁷ Bosnian security expert, Vlado Azinovic, also believes that the roots of Islamic militancy in the country and the fact that approximately 200 young men had recently gone to fight for the Islamic State in Iraq or Syria is a result of the ideology brought in by the Mujahedeen fighters during the 1992-95 Bosnian war.⁵⁸ Given that some of the Mujahedin fighters had remained in the country, many experts, including Azinovic, claim that it is the

⁵⁴ Alison Pergeter, “Localism and Radicalization in North Africa: Local Factors and the Development of Political Islam in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya.” *International Affairs* 85, no. 5 (2009): p.1039

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1044

⁵⁶ <http://www.ibtimes.com/six-bosnians-arrested-us-providing-money-weapons-isis-1808724>

⁵⁷ Cocoli, Isabela. “Islamic Radicalization Stirs Concern in Bosnia.” VOA. April 30, 2015. Accessed December 31, 2015. <http://www.voanews.com/content/islamic-radicalization-stirs-concern-bosnia/2743574.html>.

⁵⁸ Dzidic, Denis. “Bosnia’s Wartime Legacy Fuels Radical Islam.” *Bosnia’s Wartime Legacy Fuels Radical Islam*. May 13, 2015. Accessed December 31, 2015. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-s-wartime-legacy-fuels-radical-islam>.

direct impact of these groups on vulnerable young people that resulted in the consequent attraction of the youth toward radical ideas and their motivation for seeking opportunities to aid their Muslim brothers in conflict. “Once a destination country for foreign fighters in the 1990s, Bosnia is now the country of origin for volunteers in other people’s wars.” Statistics show that Bosnia yields one of the largest groups of foreign jihadists in Europe, prompting officials in the country to crack down on extremists. Another report published by the European Parliament in 2013 showed that about 3,000 people in Bosnia identified themselves as Wahhabists, a conservative Muslim movement introduced in the country in the early 90s. Bosnian officials have stated that the group primarily identifies itself with ISIS ideology and is responsible for influencing countless of unemployed, hopeless and vulnerable Bosnian youth.

Similarly, in the case of Kenya,⁵⁹ officials have recognized that some mosques serve as breeding grounds for radicalization and are luring young people into wars, fueling conflicts and further dividing the already stratified country. As a backlash to the emerging incidences of radicalization through institutional influence, mosques and other Islamic communities are under increasing scrutiny and are very keen to rebuild a positive image and disassociate themselves from radical affiliations by highlighting the basic principles of Islam as a peaceful religion that forbids violence. In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has used all sources available including, infiltration, surveillance and monitoring in order to “prevent” the seeds of radicalization from growing in local Muslim communities. “In addition to using paid informants to monitor mosques, the FBI has also asked—and sometimes pressured—American Muslim community members to report on the views and activities of their fellow worshippers.”⁶⁰ However, very often, the local Muslim community saw these actions, as a strategic tool for racial profiling and a violation of their basic human rights.

Taking a neutral stand to the legality of such policy making in the US, it's important to note and acknowledge that, in fact, many policy makers across the globe have come to the conclusion that in-person, on-the-ground interaction is equally, if not more relevant to the process of radicalization to online and other means of influence. Consequently, they have

⁵⁹ All Africa, Kenya warns of mosque closure, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201409160310.html>, (accessed January 22, 2016)

⁶⁰ Faiza Patel, Brennan Center for Justice, Rethinking Radicalization, http://brennan.3cdn.net/f737600b433d98d25e_6pm6beukt.pdf, p28, (accessed January 25, 16)

attempted to implement measures to contain and control the interpersonal communication and contact in many Muslim religious institutions.

Conclusion

*It is an act of arrogance to think that the subordinate are poor, rejects, victims of destiny, and therefore incapable of reacting or planning, needing something originating elsewhere to enable them to speak.*⁶¹

People will always find ways to materialize their ideas and put them into practice, and therefore, we should never ignore those that think their ideas are not only rejected, but simply impossible to implement under social constraints. In addition to the lack of a universally accepted definition or the scope of the term *radicalization*, it is important to note that so far, no credible correlation has been made between a person being conclusively radicalized, and one absolutely determined to engage in violent actions. Of course, this paper is not suggesting that any idea picked up online or from an extreme local imam would lead a person to immediately strap him or herself with explosives, nevertheless there is also growing evidence of correlation between the exposure of radicalism and perceived inequalities with a certain level of action or support, and that one should not underestimate the seducing power of religion and or its ideological interpretation. “Religious fundamentalism will continue to grow around the world, because it offers a powerful response to modernization and globalization, which specifically resonates with communities who do not view secularization as an inevitable aspect of the shift into modernity.”⁶² Until religious fundamentalism is treated as a sociopolitical force in its own right, and unless its causes are dealt with in a holistic manner, it will continue to grow, fueling conflicts around the world.⁶³

On the other hand, media’s hysterical broadcasting and sensationalist reporting and willingness to air content originating from social media, as well as its relentless approach to demonize all Muslim populations and generalize them on the actions of a few radicals creates ever-increasing frustration, general bigotry and division in multiethnic societies. The media

⁶¹ Henry Barbara, The play of mirrors, Representation of the self and the other in fragmented globalization , <http://www.sifp.it/pdf/Art-Henry1-DEF3.pdf>, (Accessed December 24, 2015)

⁶² G. Honor. Fagan (ed.), Ronaldo Munck (ed.), Globalization and Security [Social and Cultural Aspect]: An Encyclopedia, (Praeger, October 27, 2009) p.149

⁶³ Ibid, p. 150

seeking sensationalism for the purpose of spreading fear and increasing profit from what Samuel Huntington has called “Clash of Civilizations” will continue to blur the actual process of radicalization, the tools used in its propagation, and its actual impact on actions. The worldwide media (and to some extent academia) earnestly picked up the radicalization concept and misused it to portray and further the religious ideological divide destabilizing international security. Finally, some governments also went as far to justify monitoring actions, infiltrations and surveillance of their citizens under the guise that preventing radicalization is key to combating violent extremism, and given the evidence, this might seem like an important conclusion. However, how much of a threat does radicalization truly pose? How much of it is constantly overblown by media, and how much by the governments? Finally, since one is unable to completely compare the two types of radicalization discussed here, it might never be possible to say that seeing a local imam in community centre was precisely the reason one has decided to join “a Holy War”, nor it will be possible to say that a young man living in a remote village in the north of Morocco was never exposed to aired content that triggered his actions. However, what we are able to do with certainty is attempt to highlight the tools employed in the radicalization process, and acknowledge that there are additional factors impacting the process and the public perception and public policy towards it. Many prominent authors who have devoted decades to the study of terrorism and radicalization, such is Bruce Hoffman, would simply state that online and offline exposure to radical ideas are equally important causal factors and that “The requirement to engage in jihad is relentlessly expounded in [...] web sites, and radical clerics who lay preachers speaking in mosques or addressing informal circles of adherents in more private settings”⁶⁴ Finally, Hoffman will conclude that “the principle of jihad is the ideological bond that unites this amorphous movement, transcending its loose structure, diverse membership, and geographical separation.”⁶⁵ Von Behr et al. claim that “the Internet is one aspect of radicalization, and it is essential for future research to look both online and offline to be able to understand the process as a whole.”⁶⁶ We can conclude that even though the subject of radicalization is

⁶⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Revised and Expanded Edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, p.310

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p.310

⁶⁶ Ines, Von Behr, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards, and Luke Gribbon. “Radicalization in the Digital Era.” *Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism*. 2013, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR453.html. Accessed February 21, 2016, p. 16

extensively researched, the field is still in need of expansion and enrichment by most importantly, the primary empirical data. Although all radicalization mechanisms are relevant, social media is the most powerful, because it is the easiest, fastest and a borderless means of spreading and influencing certain ideology. The Internet, after all, is the 21st century's Television and Radio. From the literature overview we were able to understand that no credible author would undermine the use of social media in radicalization, but that many would be hesitant to claim it is *the only* way, and would look beyond Internet into offline radicalization.

There will be a great need in the future to empirically study and theoretically further explore what environmental and personality characteristics lead to radicalization. Likewise, it will be essential to identify the most successful ways radicalization is employed that leads to violent action, both for the essential purpose of combating its propagation and also for shattering the media's bias toward fanning the fires of Muslim extremism. Since the radicalization of youth in North American and Western Europe will only tend to increase in the coming years, based on the multitude of factors, closer cooperation between various law enforcement and counter-terrorism agencies is vital. In addition, academics as well as media will need to further explore channels without fueling confusion in the area of radicalization. The Arab spring, as well as recent economic crisis has made a lot of young people in Western societies anxious and looking for ways to engage meaningfully in the "struggle for justice" and thus has put more pressure on counterterrorism policy worldwide. It is important in this struggle for de-radicalization of youth to engage local community to its fullest potential, as teachers, coaches and parents are missing the early clues of radicalization process. As a society of isolated individuals concerned with accumulation of wealth North America and Western Europe are missing the link with their disenchanting young population that is spending increasingly more time with those *who offer meaning* and less in the community *that offers belonging*. The need to combat online radicalization, as well as local charismatic radical Islamists is placed on the shoulders of law enforcement, but the community has to share the burden if it is to be successful in this battle. Communication between all levels of governments and community is vital for the success of de-radicalization.

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